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I. INTRODUCTION
For more than a century, Americans have believed that the social ills
fostered by gambling outweigh its recreational value.' As a result, gambling
has been extensively regulated in order to restrict access to, and control the
operation of, legalized gambling facilities.2
These restrictions, however, have not diminished gambling's
popularity.3 Moreover, significant technological developments, most
notably the Internet, threaten to circumvent the current regulatory approach
in ways that were unimaginable just a few years ago. Unlike brick-and-
mortar casinos, the action at "virtual casinos" and in other forms of online
t Partner, Debevoise & Plimpton, New York, New York. The author thanks R. Townsend
Davis, Jr., a Debevoise associate, for his help in conceptualizing this Essay, and Peter Johnson,
also a Debevoise associate, for his enormous assistance in researching and editing it. Debevoise &
Plimpton represents several professional sports leagues, which have a decided interest in curbing
the spread of Internet gambling.
1. See generally Valley Broad. v. United States, 107 F.3d 1328, 1331-32 (9th Cir. 1997)
(acknowledging suppression of gambling's social ills as a legitimate governmental interest), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 1050 (1998); Players Int'l v. United States, 988 F. Supp. 497,502 (D.N.J. 1997)
(same). In addition to the links to crime so often depicted in popular culture, see, e.g., NICHOLAS
PILEGGI, CASINO: LOvE AND HONOR IN LAS VEGAS 177-80 (1995) (detailing the links between
gambling and both organized and unorganized crime), these problems include harms to the
individual gambler, such as gambling addiction and its fallout-family abuse, workplace abuse,
tax evasion, absenteeism, embezzlement, etc. See infra notes 23, 118-138 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 120-128 and accompanying text.
3. See TIOTHY L. O'BRIEN, BAD BET: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE GLAMOUR, GLITZ, AND
DANGER OF AMERICA'S GAMBLING INDUSTRY 4 (1998) (asserting that, judged by the estimated
$586.5 billion spent in 1996, legal "gambling is now more popular in America than baseball, the
movies, and Disneyland-combined').
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gambling4 is nonstop and accessible to anyone with Internet access.5 Bets
can be placed anonymously or pseudonymously, regardless of the bettor's
age, sobriety, or finances. Moreover, unlike lawful domestic gambling
operations, many Internet gambling sites operate from servers in foreign
countries that are unsupervised by U.S. government regulators.
The sudden and ready accessibility of Internet gambling has the
potential to turn every home and office into a gambling parlor. Such
widespread, unsupervised, and unregulated access, however, is completely
inconsistent with a regulatory model that frowns on teenagers playing
lotteries or entering casinos.6 Thus, the government's interest in regulating
Internet gambling is at least as strong as, if not stronger than, its interest in
regulating gambling in its traditional forms.7
There are, however, at least two related schools of thought rejecting this
view. First, many commentators believe that the unique attributes of the
Internet, not the least of which is its inherently transborder nature, require it
to be treated as a separate and sovereign jurisdiction where traditional legal
approaches should not apply.8
Second, operators of online gambling sites offer a specific variation on
this theme. They maintain that they escape U.S. law by locating their server
and related operations offshore-in countries such as Belize, Curagao, and
4. These include sports gambling and online lotteries. See I ANTHONY CABOT, THE
INTERNEr GAMBLING REPORT: AN EVOLVING CONFLICT BETWEEN TECHNOLOGY, POLICY &
LAW 28-31 (1997).
5. At least some gambling sites appear to be covered by commercially available filtering
software. That technological fix, however, not only requires that the user install such software, but
also offers only a rudimentary, pro forma protection against use by minors and other problem
gamblers. Jay Cohen has testified that his casino "is registered with Cybersitter, NetNanny, and
Surf Watch to ensure that children are kept out of our site." The Internet Gambling Act of 1997:
Hearing on S. 474 Before the Subcomm. on Tech., Terrorism, and Gov't Info. of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1997) (statement of Jay Cohen, President & CEO,
World Sports Exch.) [hereinafter Kyl Bill Hearing]. In acknowledging that these "controls require
parents to be responsible as well," however, he admits that gambling sites have no way of
identifying their customers. Id.
6. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 313.817 (West 1994) (restricting casino gambling to
persons aged 21 and older); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 463.350 (Michie 1994) (same).
7. For example, Louisiana law provides:
The legislature has expressed its intent to develop a controlled well-regulated gaming
industry .... The legislature further recognizes that it has an obligation.., to protect its
citizens, and in particular its youngest citizens, from the pervasive nature of gambling
which can occur via the Internet and the use of computers connected to the
Internet.... Gambling which occurs via the Internet embodies the very activity that the
legislature seeks to prevent.
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:90.3 (West Supp. 1998) (emphasis added). But cf infra note 140
(suggesting that the imprecise language of the Louisiana statute may make it vulnerable to a
constitutional challenge).
8. This argument has been made with particular vigor in the intellectual property context. See,
e.g., John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas, WIRED, Mar., 1994, at 84, 85 (arguing that
traditional copyright law is obsolete in cyberspace). But cf. Panavision Int'l v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d
1316, 1321-22 (9th Cir. 1998) (asserting jurisdiction over a trademark infringement suit despite the
defendant's claim that "the injury occurred in cyberspace").
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Antigua-making it irrelevant that their American customers are playing in
Peoria. As one Internet gambling operator has put it:
All wagers take place in Antigua on our server. No money is
transferred on a bet by bet basis. People must open accounts and
wager from their accounts. When players bet they are directing a
foreign transaction, no different than moving money from one
offshore business to another .... The bet takes place in Antigua.
The money is already here .... They are making a virtual visit to
Antigua.9
These arguments are echoed in various law review articles that call for the
creation of new Internet legal models. Commentators raise the concern that,
without such a new framework, the Internet's transborder nature and unique
mores virtually ensure that no "stable body of jurisprudence" can be
developed."
The weakness underlying all of these arguments is that they accept too
literally the concept of "cyberspace" as an actual "place." In so doing, they
embrace a metaphor that is far from exclusive and, in many ways, far from
appropriate. For example, competing with the term "cyberspace" is the
description of the Internet as an "information superhighway."'" Other
metaphors and analogies abound.'
9. Kyl Bill Hearing, supra note 5, at 41 (statement of Jay Cohen, President & CEO, World
Sports Exch.); see also O'BRIEN, supra, note 3 at 13 (" 'The Internet is a global communications
technology not bound by the laws or control of any one government. Internet casinos are only
bound by the laws of their host country. Placing bets cannot be illegal because, despite their
origination, bets will technically be placed on the computer at our off-shore land-based casino site
that is legally licensed and taxed by the host government."' (quoting a statement from World Wide
Web Casinos's Internet site)).
10. Greg Y. Sato, Note, Should Congress Regulate Cyberspace?, 20 HASTINGS COMM. &
ENr. L.J. 699, 710 (1998); see also David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise
of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1367 (1996) (arguing that cyberspace should be
thought of as a distinct place because of its inherent lack of borders and transnational nature);
Lawrence Lessig, The Path of Cyberlaw, 104 YALE L.J. 1743, 1743 (1995) (raising the question,
"Is Cyberspace really anything new?"); Lawrence Lessig, The Zones of Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L.
REV. 1403, 1403 (1996) (answering the question, at least in part, by noting that many cyberspace
activities have consequences in physical space in the same way that real world acts do); Jonathan
Zittrain, The Rise and Fall of Sysopdom, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 495, 506-09 (1997) (offering a
compelling explanation of why procedural rules and substantive causes of action often do not fit
well when applied to the vigorous exchange of views often encountered online); Dan L. Burk,
Jurisdiction in a World Without Borders, 1 VA. J.L. & TECH. 3, 6 <http://scs.student.virginia.edu/
-vjolt/graphics/voll/homeart3.html> (1997) ("The geographic transparency of the Internet may
well place... adjudication of transborder disputes outside of any jurisdictional analysis yet
contemplated by territorially-bound law.").
11. See, e.g., Clay Calvert, Regulating Cyberspace: Metaphor, Rhetoric, Reality, and the
Framing of Legal Options, 20 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 541, 542, 544 (1998) (pointing out
that the phrase "information superhighway," which Vice President Gore claims to have coined, is
an overused metaphor that is not particularly apt).
12. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2344 (1997) ("Through the use of chat rooms,
any person with a phone line can become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it
could from any soapbox. Through the use of Web pages, mail exploders, and newsgroups, the
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As Professor Clay Calvert has recognized, one of the problems with
using metaphors to describe online activities is that the metaphor can
replace the reality and thus "frame our thinking too narrowly." 13 Thus,
although it may be colorful, it is not analytically useful to think of the
Internet as a transportation vehicle in which one makes "virtual" voyages. 4
To the contrary, the Internet is an earthbound network of interconnected
computers, each with a specific physical location, connected by a physical
telecommunications backbone. One no more makes a "virtual visit" when
using the Internet than when telephoning long distance.
Equally fanciful is the concept of the Internet as its own, ethereal
jurisdiction. "Cyberspace," after all, is not a real place, but a term coined in
a science fiction novel. 5 For all of its unique attributes, it "exists" as a
separate jurisdiction only in the sense that Never-Never Land does. 6
Rather than debate which of several competing metaphors may be
appropriate to describe online activities, it is more appropriate to step back
and inquire, in a media-neutral manner, whether the particular activity under
review takes on a different complexion when it occurs over the Internet as
opposed to other contexts. By eschewing all labels, one avoids having to
choose among them. By focusing on the underlying activity, one reduces the
risk of being trapped in a confining analogy. By frankly assessing the
conduct at issue, without undue regard for the medium through which it is
conducted, one gets to the heart of the policy concerns that led to the
creation of the applicable legal rule.
Internet gambling offers an excellent test case for this approach
because, although the Internet may change the mechanics of gambling by a
considerable degree, it does not change the nature of gambling itself.
Moreover, the differences in mechanics, which stem from the pervasive and
instantaneous nature of this medium, only compound the problems generally
associated with gambling. As Professor I. Trotter Hardy has noted,
notwithstanding the unique nature of some acts in cyberspace, the Internet
presents no new legal issues when it is being used "simply [as] a medium of
same individual can become a pamphleteer."); American Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp.
160, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (raising questions of whether "the Internet is more like a television? a
radio? a newspaper? a 900-line? a village green?").
13. Calvert, supra note 11, at 565.
14. See Playboy Enters. v. Chuckleberry Publ'g, 939 F. Supp. 1032, 1039 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(expressly rejecting the contention that permitting U.S. residents to access the adult web site
"Playmen," based in Italy, was the equivalent of flying to Italy to purchase a copy of Playmen
magazine).
15. W ILLIAM GIBSON, NEUROMANCER 51 (1985).
16. See J.M. BARRE, PETER PAN (1928); see also Steven R. Salbu, Who Should Govern the
Internet?: Monitoring and Supporting a New Frontier, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 429, 455 (1998)
(criticizing the "so-called cyber-libertarian ideal, which takes the term 'cyberspace' too literally");
Stephan Wilske & Teresa Schiller, International Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: Which States May
Regulate the Internet?, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 117, 124 (1997) (arguing that "it is hard to maintain
that the Net is some kind of free city in the sky").
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direct communication between people-much like the telephone, mail or
fax." ' 7 Internet gambling readily falls into that category. For the purposes of
federal antigambling laws, it is the 1990s equivalent of using the telephone
to play the numbers or place bets. It is a type of online activity whose
medium does not affect the legal consequences. Moreover, it illustrates why
certain laws, both criminal and civil, are properly applied in a media-neutral
fashion.
Most articles on Internet gambling disagree, but fall to identify what it
is about long-distance gambling online that distinguishes it from long-
distance gambling via the mail or telephone and makes it incapable of
regulation. Most focus almost exclusively on jurisdictional issues or
perceived enforcement problems, leading them to conclude that applying
United States laws to prevent online gambling operators from transacting
business with U.S. citizens is at least unwise, if not impossible."8
This Essay disagrees. Troubling policy issues lurk in the assumption
that gambling in cyberspace, along with countless other Internet issues,
requires a new legal regime. These issues are broader than the problems
associated with the proliferation of gambling. First, accepting these
17. I. Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for "Cyberspace," 55 U. Prrr. L. REV. 993,
1000 (1994). In this context, references to the telephone or fax are not useful analogies because the
Internet has directly replaced those methods of communication. One of the problems with other
Internet analogies is that they do not give sufficient recognition to the Internet's growing role as a
substitute for telephony and other means of electronic communication. See, e.g., Internet
Telephony: Growing up, ECONOMIST, May 2, 1998, at 56 (estimating that by 2003, "25% of
international call minutes worldwide will be made over the Intemet"); see also Reno v. ACLU,
117 S. Ct. 2329, 2334 (1997) ("The Internet is a 'unique and wholly new medium of worldwide
human communication."' (quoting ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 844 (E.D. Pa. 1996))).
18. Commentators on the subject have tended to emphasize the international issues raised by
Internet gambling. See, e.g., Harley J. Goldstein, On-Line Gambling: Down to the Wire?, 8 MARQ.
SPORTS L.J. 1, 51 (1997) (contending that because cyberspace should be treated as its own legal
regime, to properly regulate Internet gambling without creating an international conflict of laws,
"a regulatory framework must be formed on the international level"); John Edmund Hogan,
Comment, World Wide Wager: The Feasibility of Internet Gambling Regulation, 8 SETON HALL
CONST. L.J. 815, 827 (1998) ("Internet gambling is far less compatible with conVentional legal
methodology due to the lack of territorial containment and.., effective enforcement ... ").
Others have expressed concerns that the practical enforcement problems spawned by Internet
gambling create a reason not to prohibit Internet gambling, but to legalize and regulate it. See Kyl
Bill Hearing, supra note 5, at 47 (statement of Sue Schneider, Chairman, Interactive Gaming
Council) ("Internet gambling is inevitable.... mo prohibit this form of home entertainment is
simply not realistic."); Nicholas Robbins, Baby Needs a New Pair of Cybershoes: The Legality of
Casino Gambling on the Internet, 2 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 7, 59 (1996) (concluding that if
technology outpaces law enforcement, "America may have no choice" but to live with state-
sanctioned online gambling); Seth Gorman & Antony Loo, Comment, Blackjack or Bust: Can U.S.
Law Stop Internet Gambling?, 16 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 667, 708-09 (1996) (suggesting that
"[e]ncryption, digital communications, electronic cash, and tracing difficulties make enforcement
of the current statutes against [Internet] casinos virtually impossible" and that applying
"antiquated notions of personal jurisdiction to the borderless Internet" may be difficult); Scott M.
Montpas, Comment, Gambling On-Line: For a Hundred Dollars, I Bet You Government
Regulation Will Not Stop the Newest Form of Gambling, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 163, 184-85
(1996) (asserting that "the nature of the Internet renders isolated United States' laws
unenforceable to a large extent' and that legislators should collaborate with foreign governments
to establish a uniform policy that facilitates self-regulation).
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arguments requires a departure from existing case law upholding over one
hundred years of congressional efforts that respond to developments in
communications technology when they threaten the federal regulatory
approach to interstate and international gambling. 9 Second, a "hands off'
approach sends the wrong message to courts that otherwise must grapple,
and by and large have done so successfully, with new issues created by the
Internet and other digital technologies.2°
Third, and perhaps most disturbing, waiting for the development of a
new legal regime capable of resolving "all issues Internet" would require
turning a blind eye to the immediate and pervasive nature of the non-
Internet contacts these so-called "offshore" sites have with the United
States. Some sense of these contacts can be gained from reviewing the
complaints filed in the series of precedent-setting prosecutions commenced
in March 1998 against twenty-one Internet sports gambling sites.21 In a
direct challenge to Internet gambling operators' contentions that they avoid
violating federal antigambling laws by locating their operations offshore,
the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York has
alleged that these Web sites violate the Wire Wager Act.22 The allegations
detail the ubiquitous nature of the contacts those purportedly offshore
operations have with U.S. citizens and how similar these transactions are to
gambling transactions previously conducted by mail and telephone.
Finally, measured against brick-and-mortar casinos, Internet gambling
has a greater potential to exacerbate the abuses associated with addictive or
underage gambling and appears to pose a much higher risk to society. The
anonymity and ubiquity of Internet gambling, coupled with its reliance on
credit cards to foster long-distance betting, increases these risks, particularly
given that video gambling devices have been characterized
19. See infra notes 76-104 and accompanying text.
20. Many courts have successfully applied existing legal doctrine to Intemet-related disputes.
See, e.g., Panavision Int'l v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1324-26 (9th Cir. 1998) (ruling that
defendants' intent to sell an Internet domain name constitutes a "commercial use" for the
purposes of the federal Trademark Dilution Act); Tasini v. New York Times, 972 F. Supp. 804,
818-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (applying the concept of "media-neutrality" to conclude that a copyright
holder's right to publish a "revision" of collective works includes digital, on-line revisions, even
if the digital nature of the medium resulted in differences from the original print publications);
Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal.
1995) (declining to adopt a purely literal approach to the Copyright Act and concluding that an
online service provider was not contributorily or vicariously liable for users' posting of
copyrighted material, if the provider had no actual knowledge of infringing acts). I previously have
commented on the importance of creative uses of common and statutory law to resolve technology
disputes given the time it takes to achieve more comprehensive legislative solutions. See Bruce P.
Keller, Condemned To Repeat the Past: The Reemergence of Misappropriation and Other
Common Law Theories of Protection for Intellectual Property, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 401
(1998).
21. See infra notes 105-116 and accompanying text.
22. 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1994); see infra notes 105-116 and accompanying text.
1574 [Vol. 108: 1569
Gambling in Cyberspace
as the most addictive form of gambling. Some call them the "crack
cocaine" of the gambling world. When the personal computer
becomes a video gambling machine, the problem gambler will
confront a powerful temptation in the next room 24 hours a
day... [A]s Internet gambling grows, society stands to suffer from
more gambling addiction.
In short, there are powerful policy and process reasons why it makes
sense to prosecute those who entice and enable U.S. citizens to gamble
online. Even after giving due deference to the nearly unanimous line of
contrary commentary, this Essay concludes: (1) there is nothing unique
about Internet gambling that should lead the federal government to abandon
its traditional protective role in this area;24 and (2) there is no reason why
existing gambling laws cannot be applied online as successfully as other
laws have been.
Part II of this Essay gives a brief overview of U.S. gambling laws,
including the role of federal law in maintaining the integrity of each state's
approach to gambling. It focuses on the Wire Wager Act, which has become
the federal government's main weapon against Internet gambling. Part III
details various failed attempts to challenge federal antigambling laws,
leading to Part IV, which describes the recent prosecutions of Internet
gambling site operators under the Wire Wager Act. Part V analyzes the
societal concerns that necessitate regulation of Internet gambling and
discusses why the appropriate application of federal law avoids both
constitutional and practical concerns. Finally, Part VI concludes by
emphasizing how laws governing real space can be applied successfully to
cyberspace in a media-neutral way.
23. Kyl Bill Hearing, supra note 5, at I I (statement of James E. Doyle, Att'y Gen., State of
Wis.). Largely because of the dangers that Internet gambling poses to minors and problem
gamblers, the National Gambling Impact Study Commission is expected to "seek a broad ban on
online gambling when it issues its report in June [19991." Online Gambling Ban To Be
Recommended When Gaming Study Panel Issues Its Report, 4 Elec. Commerce & L. Rep. (BNA)
261, 261 (Mar. 24, 1999) [hereinafter Online Gambling Ban]. "[C]reated by Congress as an
independent body," the Commission will "conduct a comprehensive study of the social and
economic impacts of gambling in the United States." ML at 262.
24. See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 69 F.3d 1296, 1300 (5th Cir.
1995) (ruling that the federal government has an interest in protecting its citizens from gambling
that is independent of states' interests in doing so), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 863 (1999); see also
Online Gambling Ban, supra note 23, at 262 (stating that the recommendation by the
Commission's Regulation, Enforcement, and Internet Subcommittee "was prompted by state
concerns that the federal government should take the lead in regulating Internet gambling").
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I. AN OVERVIEW OF U.S. GAMBLING LAWS
A. State Laws
Gambling legislation is largely a matter of state law and, as a result,
varies considerably, running from prohibition to regulation to taxation to the
even more remunerative scheme of outright cooption, most notably in the
form of state-run lotteries.' Utah, for example, allows its citizens no access
to gambling-hosting even a private poker game is outlawed.26 Conversely,
Nevada, Utah's next door neighbor, is well-known for taking quite a
different approach.'
Private lotteries-a form of gambling traditionally defined as games in
which people pay consideration for the opportunity to win a prize based on
chance rather than skil128-are unlawful in every state.29 Filling the void,
however, are the thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia that run
their own lotteries, on which people bet thirty-five billion dollars per year.3"
Similarly, although most states prohibit private off-track betting on horse
and dog races, a number run their own off-track betting parlors, where total
bets exceed over two billion dollars annually. Seven states allow off-track
bets to be placed by phone."
25. Cf. Interstate Horseracing Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C. § 3001(a)(l)-(2) (1994) ("The Congress
finds that ... the states should have the primary responsibility for determining what forms of
gambling may legally take place within their borders [and] ... the Federal Government should
prevent interference by one State with the gambling policies of another ... ").
26. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1102 (1953) ("A person is guilty of gambling if
he... knowingly permits any gambling to be played, conducted, or dealt upon or in any real or
personal property owned, rented, or under the control of the actor, whether in whole or in part.").
Hawai'i is the only other state to outlaw all forms of gambling. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 712-
1223 (Michie 1994) ("A person commits the offense of gambling if he knowingly advances or
participates in any gambling activity.... Gambling is a misdemeanor.").
27. See NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 463.0129 (Michie 1994) ("The legislature hereby finds, and
declares it to be the public policy of this state, that... [tihe gaming industry is vitally important to
the economy of the state and the general welfare of the inhabitants."). See generally O'BRIEN,
supra note 3, at 22-57 (describing the evolution of Las Vegas as a gambling mecca).
28. See FCC v. ABC, 347 U.S. 284,290 (1954).
29. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4304(d) (1995) (criminalizing "conducting a lottery, or
with intent to conduct a lottery possessing facilities to do so"); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 356
(1996) ("No person shall draw any lottery or sell any lottery ticket in this State; nor shall any
person sell ... anything by which the vendor or other person promises or guarantees that any
particular number, character, ticket or certificate shall in any event or on the happening of
contingency entitle the purchaser or holder to receive money, property or evidence of debt.") This
was not always the case. Lotteries were quite popular in colonial times and "[sluch elite Ivy
League Universities as Harvard, Yale, Princeton, and Columbia were built in part through
lotteries." O'BRIEN, supra note 3, at 158; see also A.R. Spofford, Lotteries in American History,
in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE YEAR 1892, at 171,
171-95 (1893) (describing the use of lotteries to fund both public and private works in the colonial
and early federal era).
30. See North American Ass'n of State & Provincial Lotteries, Data Compiled Regarding FY
1998 vs. FY 1997 Lottery Sales and Profits (1998) (on file with The Yale Law Journal).
31. See 1 CABOT, supra note 4, at 29.
1576 [Vol. 108: 1569
1999] Gambling in Cyberspace 1577
In recent years, the prospects of gambling as a taxable revenue source,
directly or in the form of increased tourism revenues, has proven irresistible
to many states. The number of states that permit, regulate, and tax casino or
riverboat gambling grew from just two in 1988-Nevada and New Jersey-
to twenty-five today.32 Today, every state except Utah and Hawai'i has
legalized some form of gambling.3" It is therefore hardly surprising that, in
1996, legal wagering of all kinds in the United States totaled over
$550 billion. 4 In an effort to ensure that some of the social ills linked to
gambling are not fostered by these state authorized operations, a number of
states specifically require that information about and help for compulsive
gambling be published in conjunction with information about state-run
lotteries and at state-run gambling sites.35 Others allocate a percentage of
lottery revenues to Gamblers Anonymous and other treatments for problem
gamblers.36
B. Federal Laws
The historical federal response to gambling recognizes that this
hodgepodge approach has created wide variations among even neighboring
states. As a result, Congress consistently has acted to ensure that neither
interstate nor foreign commerce is used to circumvent whatever choices
have been made at the state level.37 This approach, adopted by Congress "as
32. Twenty-three states allow casino gambling, while two other states host casino "crusies to
nowhere," where the gambling takes place in international waters. See National Coalition Against
Legalized Gambling, NCALG Fact Sheets: Legalized Gambling Has Rapidly Expanded (visited
Feb. 22, 1999) <http:llwww.ncalg.org/pages/ftshts.htm>.
33. See id.; see also Jon Bigness, Companies Place Bets on Internet Gambling, C-l. TRIB.,
Aug. 25, 1997, at 1, 4 (" (S]ome form of gambling is legal in just about every state and... more
than half of all states have casino establishments .... ). As a result of the Indian Regulatory
Gaming Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2701(21) (1994), Indian tribes have the right to operate gambling casinos
on Indian lands. See id. § 2701(5).
34. See O'BRIEN, supra note 3, at 4; Bigness, supra note 33, at 2.
35. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-4007.1A (Michie 1997 & Supp. 1998) ("All lottery
tickets printed after July 1, 1997, shall bear a toll-free telephone number for 'Gamblers
Anonymous' or other organization which provides assistance to compulsive gamblers."); id.
§ 59.1-369.3 (" [Llicensees [shall) post, in a conspicuous place in every place where pari-mutuel
wagering is conducted, a sign which bears a toll-free telephone number for 'Gamblers
Anonymous' or other organization which provides assistance to compulsive gamblers.").
36. See, e.g., IOVA CODE ANN. § 99E.10.1.a (West 1996) ("An amount equal to three-tenths
of one percent of the gross lottery revenue shall be deposited in a gamblers assistance fund in the
office of the treasurer of the state."). Notwithstanding these programs, it is fair to question the
strength of legislative convictions about the evils of gambling in light of the number of states that
run lotteries and the numerous exceptions carved out of antigambling states. See, e.g., Pic-A-State
Pa., Inc. v. Reno, 76 F.3d 1294, 1303 (3d Cir. 1996) (considering, but ultimately rejecting, the
argument that because the majority of states have legalized lotteries, lotteries may not be
prohibited on moral grounds); Players Int'l v. United States, 988 F. Supp. 497, 506-07 (D.N.J.
1997) (expressing concern over the manner in which the federal policy of banning certain casino
advertising is subverted by numerous exceptions).
37. See, e.g., United States v. Edge Broad., 509 U.S. 418, 421 (1993) (noting that "Congress
has, since the early 19th century, sought to assist the States" in their respective efforts).
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early as 1827," has evolved over the years in response to developments in
communication and transportation." These efforts culminated, in the 1960s,
with an approach reflected in the Wire Wager Act,39 the statute that most
directly precludes efforts to use the Internet to communicate with U.S.-
based gamblers.4"
The congressional role has been to prevent interstate commerce from
being used to breach the walls states have erected to regulate gambling
within their borders. In 1827, Congress began by targeting the federal
government's then most ubiquitous representatives in interstate commerce:
postmasters. It prohibited any postmaster from acting "as agent for lottery
offices." 41 A few years later, concerned that even if individual postmasters
were not assisting in the promotion of gambling, the mails certainly could
be used for that purpose, Congress expanded the prohibition to outlaw any
use of the U.S. mail to promote "lotteries... or other similar enterprises
offering prizes of any kind... . 42 In the 1890s, when lotteries attempted to
circumvent the mailing ban by advertising in newspapers, Congress
responded by outlawing the mailing of any newspapers that carried such
advertising' and by prohibiting the transportation of lottery tickets in
interstate commerce. 4
Faced with the communications revolution spawned by radio
broadcasting, Congress in 1934 criminalized broadcast advertising
containing information about commercial lotteries.45 The language of this
38. Valley Broad. v. United States, 107 F.3d 1328, 1329 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.
Ct. 1050 (1998). Interestingly, in the early 1800s, Congress itself improperly authorized the sale of
"National Lottery" tickets in states where lotteries are illegal. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) 264 (1821) (upholding the indictment in Virginia of agents selling lottery tickets
authorized by Congress to raise money for a canal in the District of Columbia and Maryland).
39. 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1994).
40. See infra notes 58-75 and accompanying text.
41. Act of Mar. 2, 1827, ch. 61, § 6,4 Stat. 238.
42. Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 246, § 13, 15 Stat. 196.
43. See Anti-Lottery Act of 1890, ch. 908, § 1, 26 Stat. 465.
44. See id. The current iteration of this prohibition is found at 18 U.S.C. § 1301 (1994).
45. See Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, cl. 652, § 316, 48 Stat. 1064, 1088. The
current prohibition on such broadcasts is found at 18 U.S.C. § 1304. Courts have split on the
constitutionality of this prohibition. In United States v. Valley Broadcasting Co., 107 F.3d 1328
(9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1050 (1998), and Players International v. United States,
988 F. Supp. 497 (D.N.J. 1997), the courts determined that the prohibition, as applied to broadcast
advertisements in Nevada and New Jersey, respectively, for legal casino gambling, violated the
casino operators' First Amendment rights. Both courts based their holdings largely on the
exemption from the ban that allows casinos operated on Indian reservations to advertise on
television, reasoning that this exemption effectively undercuts the desired effect of the ban. See
Valley Broad., 107 F.3d at 1336; Players Int'l, 988 F. Supp. at 506. In Greater New Orleans
Broadcasting Ass'n v. United States, 149 F.3d 334, 338 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct.
863 (1999), however, the Fifth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion regarding broadcast
advertising for legal casino gambling in Louisiana and Mississippi, holding that "[t]he government
may legitimately distinguish among certain kinds of gambling for advertising purposes,
determining that the social impact of activities such as state-run lotteries, Indian and charitable
gambling include social benefits as well as costs and that these other activities often have
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statute, although targeted at the novel threat posed by the new technology of
broadcasting, incorporated prior terminology by condemning any
advertising for a "lottery" or "similar scheme." 6 The Supreme Court,
however, has held that these historical concepts are broad enough to cover
any game of chance played for consideration,47 a definition that has been
held to encompass casino and other modem forms of commercial
gambling.4
3
Another illustration of Congress's efforts to protect, state choices while
keeping pace with technological changes was its response to the
proliferation of state-sanctioned lotteries.49 Through the 1980s, individuals
in non-lottery jurisdictions wishing to play lotteries run by other states
would arrange for agents in those states to purchase lottery tickets for them
and illegally ship them back."0 In the 1990s, however, new communications
technologies made the physical shipping of tickets unnecessary. One
company, Pic-A-State, began accepting lottery picks for out-of-state lottery
tickets on behalf of its customers, giving them only a computer-generated
receipt.5' Tickets were purchased by Pic-A-State's employees in a lottery-
lawful state, but any payouts were based on Pic-A-State's computer records
in the customer's jurisdiction. This avoided the necessity of transporting
actual lottery tickets across state lines, nicely sidestepping the transportation
prohibition of 18 U.S.C. § 1301.52
In response to this technological loophole, Congress amended § 1301 in
the Interstate Wagering Amendment. 53 The statute now outlaws, in addition
to the physical trafficking of lottery tickets in interstate commerce, any
business, engaged in selling chances to win "in a lottery, gift, enterprise or
similar scheme" conducted by a State, that "knowingly transmit[s] in
dramatically different geographic scope." The circuit split will likely be resolved by the Supreme
Court when it decides Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass'n.
46. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 652, § 316,48 Stat. at 1088.
47. See FCC v. ABC, 347 U.S. 284, 290 (1954) (stating that 18 U.S.C. § 1304 prohibits any
form of gambling where prizes are awarded, according to chance, for consideration). The Court,
however, rejected the FCC's argument that radio and television quiz shows that gave away prizes
to contestants at home fell within this broad definition, holding that tuning into these programs did
not constitute consideration. See id. at 294.
48. See, e.g., Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 69 F.3d 1296, 1298-99 (5th
Cir. 1995) (holding that § 1304 prohibits advertising for casino gambling), cert. granted, 119 S.
Ct. 863 (1999); Players Int'l v. United States, 988 F. Supp. 497, 506 (D.N.J. 1997) (holding that
broadcasts for casino gaming fall within the prohibition of § 1304).
49. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
50. See, e.g., United States v. Steubben, 799 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1986) (affirming the
conviction of the operator of a company engaged in this business under, inter alia, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1301).
51. See Pic-A-State Pa., Inc. v. Reno, 76 F.3d 1294, 1297 (3d Cir. 1996).
52. See id.
53. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 § 320,905, Pub. L. No. 103-
222, 108 Stat. 1796,2126 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 1301).
1999] 1579
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 108: 1569
interstate or foreign commerce information to be used to procure such a
chance."54
The Interstate Wagering Amendment was not the first time Congress
elected to supplement individual states' approaches to gambling by
outlawing interstate transmissions of "information" pertaining to
gambling.5 It previously did so in the Wire Wager Act, 6 one of several
anti-racketeering laws passed in the 1960s to combat organized crime. 7 It is
the breadth of the Wire Wager Act that has attracted the most attention in
the Internet gambling context because, notwithstanding the potential
applicability of other federal laws,58 it directly prohibits the use of a wire
transmission facility to foster a gambling business. It provides, in relevant
part:
Whoever being engaged in the business of betting or wagering
knowingly uses a wire communication facility for the transmission
in interstate or foreign commerce of bets or wagers or information
assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on any sporting event or
contest, or for the transmission of a wire communication which
entitles the recipient to receive money or credit as a result of bets or
wagers, or for information assisting in the placing of bets or
54. Id.; see also Pic-A-State Pa., 76 F.3d at 1297 (noting the amendment of § 1301 from
penalizing one who "carries" lottery tickets to one who "transmits" such tickets).
55. See Pic-A-State Pa., 76 F.3d at 1302; see also Valley Broad. v. United States, 107 F.3d
1328, 1335 (9th Cir. 1997) (striking down on First Amendment grounds § 1304's ban on broadcast
advertising of casino gambling, despite the government's asserted interest "'to assist states that
prohibit casino gambling ... by regulating interstate activities such as broadcasting that are
beyond the powers of individual states to regulate'), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1050 (1998).
56. 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1994). Section 1084 serves the twin purposes of assisting states in their
respective approaches to gambling and suppressing gambling overall. See United States v.
McDonough, 835 F.2d 1103, 1104-05 (5th Cir. 1988) (explaining that the dual purposes of § 1084
are to assist state law enforcement "'and to aid in the suppression of organized gambling
activities"' (quoting H.R. REP. No. 967 (1961), reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2631, 2633)).
57. Its companion laws were the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1994), which outlawed
"travel[] in interstate or foreign commerce or [use] ... [of] the mail" in furtherance of "unlawful
activity," including "any business enterprise involving gambling"; the Interstate Transportation of
Wagering Paraphernalia Act ("ITWPA"), 18 U.S.C. § 1953 (1994), which rendered unlawful the
introduction into interstate commerce of "any record, paraphernalia, ticket, certificate, bills, slip,
token, paper, writing or other device used, or to be used" in gambling; and 18 U.S.C. § 1955
(1994), which prohibited owning or operating an illegal gambling business, which is defined as a
gambling business that violates state law, involves five or more persons and either is in
substantially continuous operation for more than 30 days or has a gross revenue of more than
$2000 in any single day.
58. Internet gambling sites, as currently operated, appear to violate several of the provisions
of these acts. For instance, the allegations in the Southern District of New York prosecutions
recount the use of the mails and telephone to provide information and set up accounts for
gamblers, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952. See infra notes 108-113, 172-174, 196-209 and
accompanying text. Similarly, operations involving five or more persons violate § 1955, and the
shipping, via interstate commerce, of the hardware and software needed to run the offshore
computers may violate § 1953.
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wagers, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
two years, or both.59
This language, on its face, is broad enough to cover Internet gambling,
which, given today's technology, necessarily involves the use of a "wire
communication facility"'6 for "the transmission" of "bets or wagers" or
information that assists the "placing of bets or wagers."
Particularly significant for the application of § 1084(a) to Internet
gambling is that it does not simply outlaw the placing or taking of bets or
wagers, as, for example, many state laws do. Instead, it focuses on the
knowing "use" of a wire communication facility in connection with a
gambling business.61 Properly analyzed, this should marginalize disputes
over whether a transmission in violation of the Act requires the placing or
receiving of bets. The Act underscores this point by prohibiting not only the
act of gambling, but also transmissions of any information that make it
possible to bet in the first place.
Furthermore, § 1084 prohibits the interstate transmission of bets or
gambling information irrespective of whether the ultimate bet violates the
law of the state where the gambling takes place. This contrasts, for instance,
with § 1955, which criminalizes gambling businesses only to the extent that
they violate state law.62 Similarly, § 1084 prevents the interstate
transmission of information that would assist gambling, such as the
transmission of basketball results from Indiana to Nevada, other than in the
context of news reporting. Section 1084(b) also allows the transmission-of
information only, not bets-from a state where betting on the event is legal
to another state where such betting is also legal.63 The House Report on
§ 1084 emphasizes that "[n]othing in the exemption, however, will permit
the transmission of bets and wagers or money by wire as a result of a bet or
59. 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) (1994).
60. A "wire communication facility" is broadly defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1081 as any form of
instrumentality or service "used or useful in the transmissions of writings, signs, pictures and
sounds of all kinds by aid of wire, cable or other like connection." As the legislative history to
§ 1084 makes clear, Congress adopted a broad definition of "wire communication facility" in part
because of the recognition that "[m]odern bookmaking depends in large measure on the rapid
transmission of gambling information." H.R. REP. No. 87-967, at 2 (1961), reprinted in 1961
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2631, 2631-32.
61. See Sagansky v. United States, 358 F.2d 195,200 (1st Cir. 1966) (" [Section] 1084(a) does
not punish the mere transmission of bets or wagers, but rather the 'use' of interstate wire
communication facilities for their transmission.").
62. See supra note 57.
63. 18 U.S.C. § 1084(b) ("Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the
transmission. . . of information for use in news reporting ... or for the transmission of information
assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on a sporting event or contest from a State or foreign
country where betting on that sporting event or contest is legal into a State or foreign country in
which such betting is legal."); see also Telephone News Sys. v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 220 F. Supp.
621, 627 (N.D. 111. 1963) (finding that § 1084(b) only exempts "certain types of transmissions-
those of information for use in news reporting and those sent from a state where the betting is legal
to another state where betting is legal").
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wager from or to any State whether betting is legal in that state or not." '
Therefore, in the online gambling context, the literal language of § 1084
condemns all Internet transmissions to the United States of the digitized bits
of information that create the virtual gambling site on a user's computer
screen.
65
Two interpretation issues, however, do exist. First, the words "wire
communication facility" arguably could fail to cover wireless transmissions.
At present, however, there are no entirely wireless ways to use the
Internet.66 Second, the specific prohibition in § 1084 on the transmission of
"information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on any sporting
64. H.R. REP. No. 87-967, at 3 (1961). As the report continues:
[p]hrased differently, the transmission of gambling information on a horserace from a
State where betting on that horserace is legal to a state where betting on the same
horserace is legal is not within the prohibitions of the bill. Since Nevada is the only
State which has legalized offtrack betting, this exemption will only be applicable to it.
Id.
65. The question of whether an unlawful transmission has occurred has, in other contexts, led
courts to focus on whether bets were placed or received. See United States v. Tomeo, 459 F.2d 445
(10th Cir. 1972) (summarizing cases reflecting a split in authority); United States v. Reeder, 614
F.2d 1179, 1184 (8th Cir. 1980) (concluding that the "prevailing view" is that § 1084(a) covers
the use of wire communications facilities by those in the gambling business, whether sending,
receiving, or both is involved). To avoid the application of § 1084(a), an offshore cybercasino
would have to argue that its server does not use the Internet to transmit anything at all, an
argument that is contrary to common sense and established case law. In Minnesota v. Granite Gate
Resorts, No. C6-95-7227, 1996 WL 767431 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 11, 1996), "the contention of
Defendants [was] that WagerNet has transmitted nothing over the Internet and that the only person
in this case who would transmit anything would be Minnesota residents who contact Wager Net."
Id. at *8. The court properly found this proposition absurd:
[W]hen the Minnesota user plugs in the URL address for Vegas.Com, if Vegas.Com
did not send an electronic transmission back to the computer user, the computer user
would see nothing. He or she would see a blank screen. The way that the pictures and
words get to the Minnesota residents is by the server, Vegas.com, automatically
transmitting it back to the Minnesota resident.... [O]ne who sets up his or her system
and knows that anyone accessing his or her site will get that information, then the
server ought to be held responsible for that information.
Id. (citing Playboy Enters. v. Chuckleberry Publ'g Co., 939 F. Supp. 1032, 1044 (S.D.N.Y. 1996));
see also United States v. Kammersell, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1200 (D. Utah 1998) (holding that the
"use of an Internet server by defendant" for an interstate message constituted a transmission).
66. Cf. Debra Baker, Betting on Cyberspace, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1999, at 54, 56 ("Although
many computer modems run over telephone wires, the complexities of Internet transmissions, as
well as satellite technology, make it unclear whether all Internet communications will fall within
the scope of the [Kyl Bill]."). Although connections to the Internet may be made wirelessly,
connections within the Internet still depend on wires, making it a "wire communication facility."
See PRESTON GRALLA, How THE INTERNET WORKS 5-7 (4th ed. 1998) (" [L]ines that connect
networks can be as simple as a single telephone line or as complex as a fiber-optic cable with
microwave links and satellite transmissions.").
Moreover, the legislative history of the Act makes clear that Congress intended to exclude
wireless communication only for fear of treading on the rights of broadcasters. The only kinds of
wireless communication specifically excluded are radio and television broadcasts:
There is nothing in this bill which would in any way affect the press, radio or TV in its
reporting of sporting events. In fact, wireless communication was not included in this
bill because it is our belief that the Federal Communications Commission has ample
authority to control the misuse of this means of communication.
S. REP. No. 87-588, at 3 (1961).
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event or contest"' 67 has led some to suggest that § 1084 covers bets or
wagers only on events or contests that involve sports. Given that the Act
also prohibits, without modification, "the transmission in interstate or
foreign commerce of bets or wagers"6 and "information assisting in the
placing of bets or wagers," 69 this would seem to be a strained interpretation.
Additionally, the House and Senate Reports on the Act consistently refer
generally to "bets and wagers" without limiting them to sports bets.70 The
singling-out of information relating to "any sporting event or contest"
reflects the popularity, at the time the Act was passed, of sports betting via
telephone.7 There also have been, however, several indictments under the
Act for numbers games carried on by telephone.72 To conclude that § 1084
is limited to sports betting, one has to accept the argument that Congress
intended to carve the numbers racket out from its reach. This would be an
unlikely conclusion, given the nexus between that form of gambling and
organized crime.73
In light of this, the Kyl bill,74 which was introduced in the 105th
Congress to regulate Internet gambling, is, at least in part, superfluous. One
of its purposes was to clarify that the Wire Wager Act covers all forms of
telecommunications used to transmit all types of gambling information,
including, but not limited to, information about sporting events. Another
purpose was to denominate "the Internet or any other interactive computer
service" as included within the channels of communication in which
gambling is forbidden.75 Such clarification seems unnecessary in light of §
67. 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
68. Id. (emphasis added).
69. l (emphasis added).
70. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 87-967, at 2-4 (1961); S. REP. No. 87-588, at 2-5 (1961).
71. See United States v. Segal, 867 F.2d 1173, 1175 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Stonehouse, 452 F.2d 455, 456 (7th Cir. 1971); Telephone News Sys. v. Illinois Bell Tel., 220
F. Supp. 621, 624 (N.D. Ill. 1963); see also PILEGGI, supra note 1, at 67 ("Robert Kennedy had
pushed a bill through Congress prohibiting the interstate transmission of any gambling
information, making Lefty's phone calls about team injuries, lineups, odds, and even weather
conditions against the law and subjecting him to arrest.").
72. See, e.g., United States v. Chase, 372 F.2d 453, 457 (4th Cir. 1967); United States v.
Giovanelli, 747 F. Supp. 897, 902 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); United States v. Manetti, 323 F. Supp. 683,
687 (D. Del. 1971). Moreover, although there is no reported decision on point, the Justice
Department and several state attorneys general have taken the position that "sporting" does not
modify "contest" and that casino-type gaming is a "contest" also prohibited under the Act. See 2
CABOT, supra note 4, at 115 & n.1 17 (" [T]he Justice Department holds the position that gambling
on the Internet is illegal under Section 1084."); id. at 114 n.l 11 (citing a private letter ruling by
the Texas Attorney General, Tex. Priv. Ltr. Rul. DM-344 (May 2, 1995), that Internet card games
violate § 1084); see also INTERNET TASK FORCE, INTERNET GAMBLING STAFF SUBCOMM.,
NATIONAL ASS'N OF ATrORNEYS GEN., GAMBLING ON THE INTERNET 17-18 (1996) (discussing
the application of Wire Wager Act beyond sports).
73. When, in 1893, the last State lottery was forced out of business in the United States,
lotteries were replaced in popularity with the numbers racket, which remained a lucrative business
for organized crime until state-authorized lotteries began to reappear in the mid-1960s. See
O'BRIEN, supra note 3, at 158-63.
74. S. 474, 105th Cong. (1997).
75. H.R. 4276, 105th Cong. (1998). As the House version of the bill provides:
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1084's plain language prohibiting the use of a "wire communication
facility," which the Internet clearly is.
III. CHALLENGES TO FEDERAL AUTHORITY To CRIMINALIZE GAMBLING
The broad language of § 1084 seems tailor-made for application to
Internet gambling. Enacted in 1961,76 however, it plainly was not drafted
with Internet gambling in mind. Yet, most of the likely constitutional
challenges that could be raised in the Internet context already have been
argued in the context of other wire communications facilities and uniformly
have been rejected. In fact, virtually all of Congress's efforts to supplement
and reinforce individual state approaches to gambling already have been
upheld against First Amendment,77 vagueness, 78 and Commerce Clause
challenges.79
The Supreme Court recently reviewed the history of congressional
antigambling legislation and challenges to it in United States v. Edge
Broadcasting." The statute at issue in Edge was 18 U.S.C. § 1304, which
prohibits radio and television stations from broadcasting lottery advertising
unless they are licensed in the state that runs the lottery being advertised." It
did not, therefore, involve facts that bear directly on the issue of Internet
gambling. Edge nevertheless set the stage for the conclusion that 18 U.S.C.
§ 1084 is lawfully applied to Internet gambling prosecutions in at least two
ways. First, the Court began its analysis by emphasizing the breadth of
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause,82 using as an example
the Louisiana Lottery, with which Congress seemed particularly concerned
in the 1890s.83 It noted that when the Louisiana Lottery moved its operations
[I]t shall be unlawful for a person knowingly to use the Internet or any other interactive
computer service... to place, receive, or otherwise make a bet or wager with any
person; or... to send, receive, or invite information assisting in the placing of a bet or
wager with the intent to send, receive, or invite information assisting in the placing of a
bet or wager.
Id.
76. See Pub. L. No. 87-216, § 2,75 Stat. 491 (1961).
77. For example, the 1876 statute prohibiting the use of the mails to promote both illegal and
state-authorized lotteries was challenged unsuccessfully on First Amendment grounds. See Ex
parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877) (upholding the Act of July 12, 1876, 19 Stat. 90). When
lotteries resorted to advertising in newspapers and Congress reacted by outlawing the mailing of
newspapers carrying such advertisements, that Act also was challenged and upheld. See In re
Rapier, 143 U.S. 110 (1892) (upholding the Anti-Lottery Act of 1890, ch. 908, § 1, 26 Stat. 465).
78. See, e.g., United States v. Borgese, 235 F. Supp. 286, 295-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); United
States v. Smith, 209 F. Supp. 907, 918 (E.D. 111. 1962).
79. See infra notes 80-90 and accompanying text.
80. 509 U.S. 418 (1993).
81. See id. at 422.
82. See id.
83. See id. at 421. This remarkably persistent lottery-apparently the last of the state lotteries
until New Hampshire revived its system in the 1960s-was chartered by the Louisiana legislature
on August 11, 1868, and given a monopoly on sales of lottery tickets within that state, partly in
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to Latin America, Congress responded by "outlaw[ing] the transportation of
lottery tickets in interstate or foreign commerce. This Court upheld the
constitutionality of that Act against a claim that it exceeded Congress's
power under the Commerce Clause.... This federal antilottery legislation
remains in effect." 8"
The case to which the Court referred was Champion v. Ames, commonly
called the Lottery Case." Champion was accused of conspiring to transport
lottery tickets between Texas and California for the Louisiana Lottery's then
most recent incarnation, the "Pan American Lottery Company," an offshore
gambling operation with monthly drawings held at Ascuncion, Paraguay.86
Because, according to Edge, the Lottery Case remains good law, 7 the
Supreme Court has already upheld the validity of a federal gambling
prosecution based, at least in part, on a gambling operation outside of the
United States, in a jurisdiction that has legalized gambling. This has obvious
significance in the Internet context.
Second, by citing with approval to the Lottery Case, the Edge Court
leads one back to Pensacola Telegraph v. Western Union Telegraph,88 on
which the Lottery Case relied extensively. Pensacola held unconstitutional
Florida's attempt to grant a local company a monopoly over the Internet's
turn-of-the-century equivalent: the telegraph. Quoting extensively from the
Pensacola Court's opinion, the Lottery Case decision emphasized that
Commerce Clause powers "'are not confined to the instrumentalities of
commerce ... known or in use when the Constitution was adopted,
but.., keep pace with the progress of the country, and adapt themselves to
the new developments of time and circumstances."'"89
self-defense, because "many millions of dollars have been withdrawn from and lost to this State
by the sale of Havana, Kentucky, and Madrid and other lottery tickets, thereby impoverishing our
own people." Spofford, supra note 29, at 190 (quoting an anonymous source). In return, the
Lottery paid $40,000 per year to the state treasury out of profits that approached one million
dollars annually. When, in 1879, the legislature repealed its grant, the Lottery successfully lobbied
a state constitutional convention for reinstatement. In 1890, faced again with extinction, the
Lottery promised the legislature $1.25 million annually for a 25-year franchise extension. This
proposal was vetoed by the governor. See id. at 190-92. After long judicial proceedings, the
Lottery moved to Honduras, leading Congress, in 1895, to add "foreign" to the type of commerce
in which lottery ticket trafficking was illegal. See Edge Broad., 509 U.S. at 422. The Louisiana
Lottery's unsavory character, its ubiquity, and its resistance to attempts to kill it earned it the
nickname "Serpent" and condemnation as "this hydra-headed monster, which is demoralizing the
young, the poor, and the needy throughout the country, as no institution in America has ever
done." G. Robert Blakey & Harold A. Kurland, The Development of the Federal Law of
Gambling, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 923, 937-39 (1978) (quoting Rep. Moore); see also O'BRIEN,
supra note 3, at 106-08 (tracing the Louisiana Lottery to its ultimate demise in Honduras in 1907).
84. Edge Broad., 509 U.S. at 422.
85. 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
86. See id. at 323. In fact, it appears the tickets in dispute were printed in the United States.
See id. at 364 (Fuller, J., dissenting).
87. See Edge Broad., 509 U.S. at 422.
88. 96 U.S. 1 (1877).
89. Lottery Case, 188 U.S. at 350 (quoting Pensacola Tel., 96 U.S. at 9).
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Then, in words directly applicable to the Internet, the Court focused on
the commercial importance of the telegraph, describing it as "'an epoch in
the progress of time. In a little more than a quarter of a century it has
changed the habits of business and, become one of the necessities of
commerce. It is indispensable as a means of intercommunication, but
especially is it so in commercial transactions."' 90 The Pensacola approach
to Commerce Clause authority makes it abundantly clear that Internet
communications in the late twentieth century, including those with foreign
implications, should be within the scope of the Commerce Clause.
More recent challenges to federal gambling legislation have arisen in
the context of criminal prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 1084, as well as its
companion legislation from the 1960s. Two such § 1084 prosecutions, in
particular, shed light on the applicability of § 1084 to online gambling.
In Martin v. United States,91 the appellants were convicted for
transmitting bets and betting information about football games by telephone
from Houston to Las Vegas.92 They challenged the constitutionality of
§ 1084 on the theory that their conviction for transmitting wagers to Las
Vegas, where those bets were legal, resulted in an unconstitutional
application of the statute "to defeat the policies of Nevada." 93 The Fifth
Circuit rejected that defense, noting that Congress's power under the
Commerce Clause to prohibit such communications was sufficiently broad
to cover communications between states taking different approaches to
gambling. The court, therefore, concluded that the interstate transmission of
wagers could be proscribed whether or not betting is lawful in the state
where the bet is received.94
United States v. Blair95 also is instructive. Blair illustrates that 18
U.S.C. § 1084 can be used to prosecute not only communications between
different states, but also between the United States and offshore, gambling-
legal jurisdictions. Blair was convicted of violating § 1084 by accepting
"wagers on professional and college basketball games from residents" of
Oklahoma "over the phone via a toll-free number he had established" while
he was located in the Dominican Republic.96 Having entered a guilty plea,
Blair argued on appeal that the district court should not have accepted the
90. Id. at 351 (quoting Pensacola TeL, 96 U.S. at 9).
91. 389 F.2d 895 (5th Cir. 1968).
92. See id. at 896.
93. Id. at 897; see also Rory K. Little, Myths and Principles of Federalization, 46 HASTINGS
L.J. 1029, 1062 n.154 (1995) (citing the Lottery Case, 188 U.S. 321, 357-58 (1903), for the
proposition that "the Supreme Court long ago rejected Tenth Amendment arguments as a bar to
assertion of federal criminal jurisdiction").
94. See Martin, 389 F.2d at 899-900; see also United States v. McDonough, 835 F.2d 1103
(5th Cir. 1988) (finding transmissions of bets from Texas to Massachusetts to be unlawful,
regardless of whether they violated Massachusetts law); Cohen v. United States, 378 F.2d 751 (9th
Cir. 1967) (finding that transmissions from Las Vegas to California were illegal).
95. 54 F.3d 639 (10th Cir. 1995).
96. Id. at 641.
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plea because no factual basis existed to establish he acted with knowledge
that federal law prohibited his offshore communications. 97 The Tenth
Circuit disagreed, holding that it was sufficient for the government to have
established Blair's knowing and willful establishment of "a bookmaking
operation in the Dominican Republic." 9'
Although none of the challenges to § 1084 have been decided by the
Supreme Court, the Justices have reviewed related legislation and concluded
that, absent a specific exemption for gambling activities authorized by state
or foreign governments, federal antigambling statutes criminalize U.S.-
based participation in such activities. For example, in United States v.
Fabrizio,99 the Court emphasized that at the time § 1084 and its companion
antigambling legislation were enacted, Congress was well "aware of legal
sweepstakes run by governments in other countries," " yet declined to enact
sweeping exemptions for such activities. Instead, it explained, Congress
took a more narrow approach, creating exemptions where it thought
appropriate. Given the absence of any such exemption in the statute Fabrizio
was accused of violating, 10' the Court concluded that even lawful state or
foreign-based gambling operations properly were included within the scope
of federal prohibitions."
The preceding line of authority undermines any argument that the
Internet is so new and unique as to fall beyond the scope of Congress's
authority to criminalize its use for certain acts. The issue of technological
uniqueness, as Pensacola shows, never has been an impediment to
congressional action. The only issue is whether the Internet is capable of
being used as an instrumentality of commerce" 3 to further gambling
activities, which plainly it is."04
97. See id. at 641-42.
98. Id. at 644.
99. 385 U.S. 263 (1966).
100. Id. at 268. The Court specifically noted legislative history offering the Irish Sweepstakes
as an example of a lawful, offshore gambling operation that nonetheless could trigger liability. ld.
at 268 n.5. Fabrizio was indicted for purchasing tickets to the 1964 New Hampshire Sweepstakes,
which was the first legal lottery in the United States. See O'BRIEN, supra note 3, at 164.
101. Fabrizio had allegedly violated the Interstate Transportation of Wagering Paraphenalia
Act ("1TWPA"), 18 U.S.C. § 1053 (1994), when he traveled to New Hampshire to purchase-on
behalf of others-75 tickets to the New Hampshire Sweepstakes and returned to Elmira, New
York with receipts acknowledging the purchases. See Fabrizio, 385 U.S. at 271,274 n.3.
102. See Fabrizio, 385 U.S. at 269.
103. The Internet already has been recognized as an instrumentality of commerce for the
purposes of criminal law. See United States v. Kammersell, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1200 (D. Utah
1998).
104. Nor is it persuasive to make the Internet-gambling specific argument that the lawful
reach of federal antigambling statutes cannot govern communications that encompass one
jurisdiction where gambling is legal. It does not appear that such a defense was asserted even in
United States v. Truesdale, 152 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 1998), where the defendants otherwise obtained
reversal of their convictions for operating a bookmaking operation in the Dominican Republic,
Jamaica, and Dallas, Texas. Truesdale is interesting because the evidence clearly showed
substantial use of toll-free telephone numbers to provide betting information and accept bets. See
id. at 444. It also showed that the head of the gambling operation lived in Dallas, but monitored his
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IV. THE RECENT APPLICATION OF § 1084 TO INTERNET GAMBLING
Internet gambling operators have not been bashful about promoting
themselves as a purportedly legal way to circumvent traditional gambling
restrictions. Those claims, however, clash with the broad reach of the
federal antigambling authority and the number of times such legislation has
withstood constitutional challenge. It was not surprising, therefore, that in
the spring of 1998, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of
New York announced the filing of criminal complaints against twenty-one
offshore Internet-gambling operators under the Wire Wager Act. These
prosecutions are the federal government's first effort to attack the
proliferation of online gambling. 5
The complaints alleged that these offshore sports gambling sites, with
names such as "Real Casino," "Galaxy Sports," and "Winner's Way,"1 06
had advertised in sports and airline in-flight magazines touting the ease and
convenience of betting via the Internet and listing their Web site
addresses. 7 Interestingly, although all the Web sites purportedly were
operated in the Caribbean or Costa Rica under licenses issued by the host
Caribbean operations through various means, including obtaining betting information via
computer. See id. at 445. For whatever reason, however, the prosecution did not rely on 18 U.S.C.
§ 1084 as the foundation for a substantive charge. Instead, the defendants were indicted for
conducting an illegal gambling business in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1955. This statute requires
proof that the operation violates the law of the state in which it is conducted. See Truesdale, 152
F.3d at 447. The government's case, however, contained no direct proof that any bets were
accepted in Texas. See id. at 447. The Fifth Circuit ruled that it was "irrational to conclude beyond
a reasonable doubt that after having gone through the effort of fully equipping, staffing, and
widely advertising the Caribbean offices, the appellant nevertheless illegally accepted bets" in
Texas. Id. at 448. Without proof of this predicate offense, all of the remaining convictions were
also reversed.
105. See infra note 229 and accompanying text.
106. United States Attorney, Southern District of New York, Press Release (visited Mar. 10,
1998) <http:llwww.rgtonline.comlnewpage/artlisting.cfm12092>; see Sealed Complaint 8,
United States v. Budin, No. 98-m-00463 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 1998) ("vww.sdbg.com"); Sealed
Complaint 8, United States v. B. Cohen, No. 98-m-00462 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 1998)
("www.realcasino.com"); Sealed Complaint 8, United States v. J. Cohen, No. 98-m-00465
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 1998) (" www.wsex.com" ); Sealed Complaint 8, United States v. Hunter, No.
98-m-00464 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 1998) ("www.galaxysports.com" ); Sealed Complaint 8, United
States v. Rogers, No. 98-m-00466 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 1998) ("www.winnersway.com" ); Sealed
Complaint 8, United States v. Ross, No. 98-m-00467 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 1998)
(" www.islandcasino.com").
107. For example, an advertisement for SDB Global appeared in College and Pro Football
Newsweekly and Pro Football Weekly stating, "Bet any sport... Anytime... Anywhere" and
offering "'[m]embers only' internet access for up-to-the-minute scores/time changes." Sealed
Complaint 29, United States v. Budin, No. 98-m-00463 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 1998) ("www.sdbg.
com"). An advertisement in Pro Football Weekly for another Web site praised football betting on-
line as a "good use for the Internet." Sealed Complaint 24, United States v. J. Cohen, No. 98-m-
00465 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 1998) ("www.wsex.com"). An advertisement in Continental Airlines's
in-flight magazine announced, "[s]portswagering [is] now available on the Internet .... Winner's
Way gives you wagering freedom at your fingertips-and it doesn't get any safer, easier or more
secure." Sealed Complaint 23, United States v. Rogers, No. 98-m-00466 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2,
1998) (" wvw.winnersway.com").
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country, the complaints indicate that several entities run by the defendants
had offices in the United States.! 8 Other United States contacts included
toll-free telephone numbers over which undercover FBI agents received
gambling information"° and could place bets,' as well as wire transfers of
money from the United States to offshore banks."' Additionally, some of
the sites used the U.S. mails to send informational brochures to American
customers.112 There were further contacts via e-mail and wire transfers of
refunds back to the United States."3 All of these communications are
alleged to have violated the prohibitions of § 1084.
In early March 1998, warrants were issued for the arrest of fourteen
gambling operators, eleven of whom surrendered or were arrested."4 A few
weeks later, warrants were issued for the arrest of seven additional gambling
operators." 5 All twenty-one were U.S. citizens. On April 9, 1998, Michael
108. See Sealed Complaint 9,23, United States v. Budin, No. 98-m-00463 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
2, 1998) ("www.sdbg.com") (alleging that promotional literature was sent from the defendant's
New York office); Sealed Complaint 22(d), United States v. B. Cohen, No. 98-m-00462
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 1998) ("www.realcasino.com") (stating that the defendant's Colorado office
was involved in marketing); Sealed Complaint 16, United States v. Rogers, No. 98-m-00466
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 1998) ("www.winnersway.com") (alleging that the defendant maintained
marketing offices in the U.S., including two offices in Las Vegas); Sealed Complaint U 8, 9, 12,
13, United States v. Stofan, No. 98-m-00644 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 1998) ("199.95.251.71/gsn/")
(stating that an informational brochure was sent from the defendant's New Jersey office, where
calls to a toll-free telephone number were answered). Where the servers were located is not clear
from the complaints. See, e.g., Sealed Complaint 31, United States v. Hunter, No. 98-m-00464
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 1998) ("www.galaxysports.com") (reporting that the defendant's Web site was
registered to a company with a Dallas address). If proven, these contacts make even less
persuasive any personal jurisdiction or due process arguments that might be raised. See infra notes
128-137 and accompanying text.
109. See Sealed Complaint I 7(b), United States v. Stofan, No. 98-m-00644 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
20 1998) (" 199.95.251.71/gsn/").
110. Seeid. 8.
I ll. To open accounts on the sports betting sites named in the Southern District of New York
complaints, FBI agents transferred funds by wire to banks in the home countries of the gambling
sites. See, e.g., Sealed Complaint 11, United States v. B. Cohen, No. 98-m-00462 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 2, 1998) ("www.realcasino.com") ("[Mhe U[nder]C[over] sent $500 by Western Union to
meet the minimum deposit requirement of Real Casino. The Western Union transfer was made out
to "Informacion -Real."); id. 24 ("[T]he originating bank of the wire transfer was Banco
Continental in Panama."); Sealed Complaint 12, United States v. Hunter, No. 98-m-00464
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 1998) ("vwww.galaxysports.com") (" T]he U[nder]C[over] opened an account
with Galaxy Sports by sending $600 by Western Union from New York, New York."); id. 18
("The check [for winnings] was written on an account of 'Bank of Nevis Ltd."').
112. See Sealed Complaint 13, United States v. Stofan, No. 98-m-00644 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20
1998) (" 199.95.251.71/gsnf').
113. See Sealed Complaint U 16, 23, United States v. B. Cohen, No. 98-m-00462 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 2, 1998) (" www.realcasino.com").
114. United States Attorney, Southern District of New York, Press Release (visited Apr. 16,
1998) <http:lwww.rgtonline.com/newspage/artlisting.cfm?textID=2153>.
115. See Sealed Complaint, United States v. Lnu, No. 98-m-00675 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 1998)
("www.wsex.com"); Sealed Complaint, United States v. Moore, No. 98-m-00677 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
24, 1998) ("www.galaxysports.com"); Sealed Complaint, United States v. Peters, No. 98-m-
00643 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 1998) ("www.ghconline.com"); Sealed Complaint, United States v.
Stofan, No. 98-m-00644 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20 1998) ("199.95.251.71/gsnl"); Sealed Complaint,
United States v. Scott, No. 98-m-00642 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 1998) (" www.wwrs.com").
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Saul of Island Casino became the first person convicted of Internet
gambling under the Act when he pled guilty to one count of conspiracy. By
December 1998, six of the twenty-one arrested had pleaded guilty to various
felonies and misdemeanors.'
6
V. WHY SHOULDN'T INTERNET GAMBLING BE PROSECUTED?
The weight of authority suggests that any defenses to these federal
prosecutions predicated on the contention that gambling is legal in the
jurisdiction where these operators place their servers ultimately should
fail."7 There is no precedent to support the suggestion that U.S. residents
are "making a virtual visit to Antigua," or that Commerce Clause power
cannot proscribe the placing of bets between New York and Antigua. The
question then arises whether there are other sound constitutional or policy
reasons for not prosecuting Internet gambling operators, either under the
Wire Wager Act or related prohibitions.
116. See Chauncey Hollingsworth, Loaded Dice? Odds Are Regulators Can't Stem Tide of
Internet Gambling, Cm. TRIB., Dec. 4, 1998, at 1. One of those arrested, Jay Cohen,
unsuccessfully sought to dismiss the indictment based on a four-step argument. First, he claimed
that no "betting" took place in the United States because all funds used to bet came out of a
customer's pre-established account in Antigua. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, United
States v. J. Cohen, No. 98 Cr. 434 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 1999). Second, he argued, because the
money was already in Antigua, the only thing being transmitted to Antigua via the Internet is
"either the placing of a bet or the transmission of information" assisting in the placing of bets. Id.
at 7. Third, he argued that the "placing of bets" is not illegal in New York, from which the
undercover agents made their online bets. Id. at 6. As support for this proposition, he cited a New
York case that criminalizes every aspect of gambling except the placing of the bets itself. See
People v. Giordano, 663 N.E.2d 588, 591 (N.Y. 1995) ("Under the statutory scheme a mere
'player' or bettor is not criminally liable but one who, in some capacity other than as a player,
participates in any gambling enterprise or activity is guilty of a crime."). Finally, he maintained
that, because "placing a bet" is legal in New York, he could not be prosecuted for violating §
1084 because of the exception in § 1084(b) that permits "the transmission of information assisting
in the placing of bets or wagers on a sporting event or contest from a State or foreign country
where betting on that sporting event or contest is legal into a State or foreign country in which
such betting is legal." See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra, at 6-8.
Cohen's argument depends, at its core, on the underlying premise that by accessing remote
Web sites, U.S. citizens make "virtual voyages" from their home states to transact business solely
in the jurisdiction where the Web site server is located. As noted, this theory already has been
rejected in other contexts. See, e.g., Playboy Enters. v. Chuckleberry Publ'g, 939 F. Supp. 1032,
1039 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (rejecting the premise that, by accessing a Web server located in Italy, the
U.S. user "transport[s] himself to Italy"). Moreover, Cohen's argument misses the point.
Regardless of whether the fractional act of "placing a bet" is legal in New York for the person
placing the bet, which it does not appear to be, see N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-401 (McKinney
1989) (declaring "all wagers, bets or stakes ... unlawful"), the "betting" transaction clearly is
illegal, as it necessarily involves more people than just the bettor, see Giordano, 663 N.E.2d at
591. Because § 1084(b) exempts only the transmission of betting information between states
where the complete transaction of betting on sports events or contests is legal, and because such
betting is not legal in New York, "information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers" that
emanates from New York does not qualify for the exception under § 1084(b). On February 5,
1999, Chief Judge Thomas P. Griesa denied Cohen's motion to dismiss. See Transcript of Oral
Argument, supra, at 57.
117. See supra notes 91-102 and accompanying texL
1590
Gambling in Cyberspace
A. The Societal Concerns Are Greater Online
The societal concerns" 8 that have led to the heavy regulation of brick-
and-mortar casinos and other forms of gambling do not evaporate online. In
fact, because there is no strict governmental oversight of online gambling
machinery and accounting procedures, the prospects for dishonest
operations increase. Moreover, the anonymity of Internet gambling makes it
easier to indulge in excessive gambling."9
States that allow traditional casinos protect against these problems in a
number of different ways:
" State gaming commissions require registration and licensing of all
gambling operations."
* Inspections of all gambling machinery and gaming tables ensure the
safety and honesty of the games themselves.'
" Rigorous accounting standards and thorough inspections of account
books ensure proper payouts, honest tax compliance, and minimal
bribery and corruption. 22
* To curb gambling impulses, many states restrict how and where
gambling operations can be advertised,"z and federal law forbids
lottery ads from being broadcast in states where lotteries are
illegal. 24
* Many states forbid gambling on credit."2
* States allow casinos to forbid gambling by drunks, 26 minors, 27 and
other problem gamblers."2
118. See Kyl Bill Hearing, supra note 5, at 3 (statement of Chairman Jon Kyl) C'Society has
always prohibited most forms of gambling because it can have a devastating effect on people and
families, and it leads to other crime and corruption if not strictly regulated.").
119. Gambling addiction also leads to absenteeism, Internet gambling at work, and a
consequent loss of productivity among people who are potentially the most productive in the work
force. See id. at 19 (statement of Ann Geer, Chair, National Coalition Against Gambling
Expansion).
120. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 27:240 (West Supp. 1999).
121. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-79 (West 1996).
122. See, e.g., MICH. COMPi. LAWS § 432.205(l)(4) (Supp. 1998); see also Kyl Bill Hearing,
supra note 5, at 5 (statement of Sen. Bryan) (" [S]ince many of these sites operate offshore, it is
beyond the reach of U.S. authorities. Such a scenario is ripe for consumer fraud. The greatest
danger posed by Internet gambling is that there is no way to control it and there is no way to
regulate it.").
123. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 19,834A(f) (West Supp. 1999).
124. See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1304, 1307 (Vest Supp. 1998).
125. See, e.g., IOWA CODEANN. § 99B.17 (West 1996).
126. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 19,835.5A(6) (West Supp. 1999).
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Internet gambling eludes these safeguards. Because offshore gambling
operations are beyond the reach of both state gambling laws and state
regulatory laws, there is no way for regulators to ensure fair games and
aboveboard accounting practices. Online gamblers already have complained
that, although their losses are deducted immediately from their online
accounts, their winnings often fail to appear.129 In most instances, the
individual'gambler does not know, or have the resources to determine, who
exactly the Internet "house" is, further reducing the guarantee of a fair
payout.
130
It also is easy to see how Internet gambling frustrates the state goals of
preventing excessive gambling and gambling by addicts and minors. By
enabling rampant advertising, it defeats advertising restrictions. By offering
gambling in the home at any hour, it defies time and place restrictions.' By
allowing gambling by credit card, it allows people to bet, not just to the
limit of their wallet or bank account, but to their credit limit. 132 Additionally,
Internet gambling operations have no way to screen out minors, drunks, or
habituals, all of whom can easily bypass the primitive and pro forma
safeguards that most sites have available. 133 This raises the prospect of
awestruck teenage techno-junkies or their gambling-addicted parents
pounding the keyboard at unpoliced Internet gambling sites twenty-four
hours a day.M Furthermore, sports gambling, an extremely popular form of
127. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 60-2E-26(E) (Michie 1997); see also Kyl Bill Hearing,
supra note 5, at 5 (statement of Sen. Bryan) ("In Nevada, one of our most important gaming
regulations is a ban on gambling until age 21.").
128. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-71 (West 1996).
129. See Lane Kelley, Betting with Internet Casino Can Be a Real Roll of the Dice, SUN-
SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.), Sept. 8, 1997, at IA; Mark Balestra, What Gives?, ROLLING
GOOD TIMES (last modified Oct. 23, 1998) <http://www.rgtonline.com/sportspage/
artlisting.cfin/2848> (describing difficulties in collecting winnings from one sports gambling site).
130. See Kyl Bill Hearing, supra note 5, at 11 (statement of James E. Doyle, Att'y Gen., State
of Wis.).
131. See Minnesota v. Granite Gate Resorts, No. C6-95-7227, 1996 WL 767431, at *4 (Minn.
Dist. Ct. Dec. 11, 1996) (quoting a WagerNet advertisement claiming to offer "a legal way to bet
on sporting events from anywhere in the world ... 24-hours a day").
132. This is of particular concern if, as some have suggested, "the bulk of gambling revenue,
as much as 80 percent comes from a small percentage of gamblers, about 20 percent." See
O'BRIEN, supra note 3, at 5.
133. See Granite Gate, 1996 WL 767431, at *4; see also Kyl Bill Hearing, supra note 5, at 5
(statement of Sen. Bryan) (" [T]here is no fool-proof way of ensuring that children can't access the
Internet gambling site."); id. ("Over the Internet, there is simply no effective way to prohibit
access by children.").
134. According to some experts, between four and eight percent of adolescents in North
America "'have a very serious gambling problem."' O'BRIEN, supra note 3, at 245 (quoting
Jeffrey Derevensky, Professor of Child Psychology, McGill University). Sports betting and card
playing often "act[ as 'gateways' to other forms of gambling and substance abuse." Id. (quoting
Howard Schaffer, Clinical Psychologist, Harvard University Medical School).
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gambling on the Internet, has been shown to be the most potentially
addicting form for adults and teenagers alike.135
Some argue that the only way to stop problem gambling is to stop
problem gamblers and to punish individual offenders instead of pursuing the
casinos. The futility of doing so and the difficulty of tracking down
individual cybergamblers have led some commentators to declare
cybergambling laws unenforceable. 36  Traditional law enforcement,
however, has never focused on the individual gambler. The Wire Wager
Act, for instance, is not aimed at individuals but at those "engaged in the
business of betting or wagering." 137 Furthermore, although some state laws
forbid individuals to gamble or to transmit "information as to wagers" over
the telephone, 38 such laws are seldom enforced.1 39 The way to control
online gambling is the same as the way government has controlled brick-
and-mortar gambling: at the source.
B. Federal Regulation and Prosecution Avoids Commerce
Clause Concerns
A potentially significant threshold limitation on applying state laws to
Internet gambling is the so-called dormant Commerce Clause.140 Dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence forbids individual states--even absent
congressional action-from regulating within their borders commerce that is
essentially national in character in such a way as to "burden" interstate
135. "According to experts on problem gaming, access to illegal sports betting on the Internet
dramatically increases the risk that people will become active, pathological gamblers. The
National Council on Problem Gambling reports that sports betting is among the most popular
forms of gambling for compulsive gambler [sic] in the United States." Kyl Bill Hearing, supra
note 5, at 15 (statement of Jeff Pash, Executive Vice President, NFL).
136. See David Post, Gambling on Internet Laws, AM. LAW., Sept. 1998, at 95 (arguing that
tracking individual gamblers "will prove ineffective because these detection mechanisms can so
easily be evaded" by disabling the site-recording features of the gambler's hard drive, encrypting
an alias, or accessing a remote computer as the "host" for a gambling session).
137. 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) (1994); see also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 225.00-.40 (McKinney 1989 &
Supp. 1998) (creating a statutory framework under which an individual bettor does not commit a
crime for placing bets, but outlawing participation in any gambling operation other than as a
player); People v. Giordano, 87 N.Y.2d 441, 446-47 (1995) (interpreting New York's gambling
statute). New York's Law of General Obligations § 5-401, a civil provision, declares "all wagers,
bets or stakes ... unlawful" and provides a civil cause of action against a person placing or
accepting bets or wagers. N.Y. GEN. OBLUG. LAW § 5-401 (McKinney 1989). Proposed federal
legislation would have targeted the individual gambler as well, making it "unlawful for a person
knowingly to use the Internet or any other interactive computer service... to place, receive, or
otherwise make a bet or wager with any person .... H.R. 4276, 105th Cong. (1998).
138. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 271, § 17A (1990).
139. See Robbins, supra note 18, at 27.
140. See Kenneth D. Bassinger, Note, Dormant Commerce Clause Limits on State Regulation
of the Internet: The Transportation Analogy, 32 GA. L. REV. 889, 920-22 (1998) (analyzing the
Louisiana Internet gambling statute and concluding that it "overreaches the boundaries imposed
by the Constitution and is ripe for a Commerce Clause challenge," in large part because of its
"imprecise language"); Post, supra note 136, at 97 (arguing that dormant Commerce Clause
concerns require a national solution to Internet gambling).
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commerce. The classic examples are the "mudguard" and "blowpost"
cases that forbid Illinois from requiring interstate trucks to change their
mudguards at its borders141 and Georgia from forcing interstate trains to stop
and blow their whistles at all 124 grade crossings between South Carolina
and Florida.142
These familiar examples were updated in the digital era by American
Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki,4 3 in which a federal district court in New York
struck down that state's Internet Indecency Act,1" which forbade the use of
the Internet "to initiate or engage in [sexually explicit] communication with
a person who is a minor." 145 Determining that the resolution of the case
"depends on the appropriate analogy," the court found "that the Internet is
analogous to a highway or railroad," making "the phrase 'information
superhighway' ... more than a mere buzzword; it has legal significance,
because the similarity between the Internet and more traditional instruments
of interstate commerce leads to analysis under the Commerce Clause." 146
The court concluded that subjecting Web pages to the vagaries of state law
"highlights the likelihood that a single actor might be subject to haphazard,
uncoordinated, and even outright inconsistent regulation by states that the
actor never intended to reach and possibly was unaware were being
accessed." 147 This made the Act "an unconstitutional projection of New
York law into conduct that occurs wholly outside New York." 148 Thus, the
court concluded that "the Internet is one of those areas of commerce that
must be marked off as a national preserve to protect users from inconsistent
legislation that, taken to its most extreme, could paralyze development of
the Internet altogether." 149
Some commentators have pointed to American Libraries Ass'n as proof
that applying state law to Internet gambling would be unconstitutional under
the Commerce Clause and risks the Internet becoming "lost in a welter of
inconsistent laws, imposed by different states with different priorities." 1 50 A
related concern is the risk that a tiny, conservative jurisdiction could
effectively mold the entire World Wide Web to fit its own moral contours.
This threat materialized in 1995, when CompuServe temporarily blocked
access worldwide to over 200 Internet sites, after a single prosecutor in
141. See Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
142. See Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Blackwell, 244 U.S. 310 (1917).
143. 969 F. Supp. 160, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
144. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.21(3) (McKinney Supp. 1998).
145. Id.
146. American Libraries Ass'n, 969 F. Supp. at 161.
147. Id. at 168-69.
148. I& at 169.
149. Id.
150. Post, supra note 136, at 97 (citation omitted).
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Munich, Germany, alleged that the sites contained sexual and other material
that violated German law.1
5
'
Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence has been considered in other
Internet contexts, however, and held not to be an impediment to state action.
In People v. Lipsitz,152 for instance, the court analyzed and rejected the
argument that dormant Commerce Clause concerns prevent the application
of New York consumer protection law to an Internet magazine-subscription
service operated from a server located in New York, the national nature of"
the service notwithstanding. It noted that "consumer protection
laws... were not designed nor aimed at regulating conduct outside this
State's borders" '53 and that, unlike the statute at issue in American Libraries
Ass'n, "these consumer protection statutes are not an attempt to regulate
speech on the Internet or create an Internet regulatory scheme." 154 Thus, the
court concluded, "the claims are of local concern, as recognized by the
nationwide system of state consumer protection laws." 15
5
The Lipsitz court was correct that the system of individual state
consumer protection laws that has developed since the 1960s never has been
thought of as triggering dormant Commerce Clause problems, even when
applied to national advertising campaigns.56 Moreover, these consumer
protection laws have, in fact, been the weapon of choice for states that have
challenged the legality of Internet gambling under state law.' 57 A problem
lurks, however, at the remedy stage. Courts must be careful to craft a state-
specific remedy that would not exclude gambling sites from jurisdictions
that have not declared them illegal. A Missouri court, for instance, having
found that a gambling Web site called Global Casino violated Missouri law,
avoided dormant Commerce Clause problems simply by enjoining the
151. See John Markoff, On-Line Service Blocks Access to Topics Called Pornographic, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 29, 1995, at Al; Paul Taylor, Internet Groups Suspended over Pornography Fears,
FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 29, 1995, at 1.




156. The problem of inconsistent or differing standards created by these laws, however, is
hardly insignificant. For that reason, courts faced with certifying national class action cases
brought under state consumer-protection laws often refuse to do so, because "variations in state
laws" make the proposed class unmanageable. See, e.g., Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84
F.3d 734,742 & n.15 (5th Cir. 1996).
157. See Thompson v. Handa-Lopez, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 738 (W.D. Tex. 1998) (alleging that
an Internet gambling Web site violated the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act by failing to pay
winnings); Minnesota v. Granite Gate Resorts, No. C6-95-7227, 1996 WL 767431, at *1 (Minn.
Dist. Ct. Dec. 11, 1996) (noting the Minnesota Attorney General's allegation that an Internet
advertisement claiming Internet gambling was legal in Minnesota was false advertising under a
consumer-protection law), aff'd, 568 N.W.2d 715 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997); Missouri Officials Sue
Indian Tribe, Seeking To Shut Down Internet Gambling Site, 2 Elec. Info. Pol'y & L. Rep. (BNA)
617, 617-18 (June 13, 1997) (discussing Nixon v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, No. CV-97-013053 (Mo.
Cir. Ct. Jackson County May 28, 1997), in which prosecutors alleged that an Internet gambling site
was in violation of Missouri's Merchandising Practices Act).
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company from setting up accounts for, and taking bets from, Missouri
residents,'58 much in the same way that some sweepstakes refuse entries
from residents of certain states.'59 When Global Casino, in violation of the
injunction, accepted such bets anyway, a criminal indictment was filed
against the company's president."6
The advantage of the federal approach described earlier 6' is that, by
accommodating each state's individual statutes, both dormant Commerce
Clause problems and state policy disputes are avoided. Support for this
proposition can be found in the circumstances that led to Pic-A-State.'62
When Pennsylvania tried to stop Pic-A-State by passing a law that
"prohibited the sale [in Pennsylvania] of any interest in another state's
lottery," 63 a federal district court struck it down on dormant Commerce
Clause grounds.'" 4  Congress then passed the Interstate Wagering
Amendment, which prohibited the interstate transmission of lottery
information. 65 This "made the Pennsylvania statute fully consistent with
federal law and not unduly burdensome on interstate commerce." 
66
C. Personal Jurisdiction and Due Process Concerns Can Be Satisfied
At first blush, ensuring that federal prosecutions of offshore Internet
gambling operators comport with due process raises more complex issues
than do other applications of long-arm jurisdiction. In fact, largely because
of these jurisdictional problems, one student note has suggested that to try to
apply existing gambling statutes to Internet gambling "would be like
158. See Pennsylvania Internet Gambling Operation Enjoined from Soliciting Missouri
Residents, 2 Elec. Info. Pol'y & L. Rep. (BNA) 585, 585-86 (June 6, 1997) [hereinafter
Pennsylvania Internet] (discussing Missouri v. Interactive Gaming & Communications Corp., No.
CV 97-7808 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Jackson County May 22, 1997)).
159. For example, a sweepstakes sponsor who failed to post the New York bond would be
required to label its sweepstakes "not open to New York residents" to avoid liability under the
statute. See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 369-e(4) (McKinney 1996) (requiring a trust account or bond
to be posted with the Secretary of State whenever a sweepstakes prize exceeds $5000). Similarly,
Florida's Secretary of State has opined that Internet sweepstakes that require entrants to subscribe
to an Internet service provider are illegal lotteries, because the subscription constitutes
consideration. See Michael Barkow, Promotion Law Overview and FAQ § C (last modified June
24, 1998) <http://www.adlaw.comRC/SWEEPS/rf-promolaw.html>.
160. See Pennsylvania Internet, supra note 158, at 585.
161. See supra notes 56-75 and accompanying text.
162. Pic-A-State Pa., Inc. v. Reno, 76 F.3d 1294 (3d Cir. 1996).
163. lId (citing PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 72, § 3761-9(c) (West 1995)).
164. See Pic-A-State Pa., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, Civ. A. No. 1: CV-93-0814, 1993 WL 325539
(M.D. Pa. July 23, 1993), rev'd, 42 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 1994).
165. See supra note 53; see also Pic-A-State Pa., Inc., 42 F.3d at 180 (reversing the district
court's order declaring the statute unconstitutional and permanently enjoining its enforcement, on
the ground that the Interstate Wagering Amendment had been enacted during the period between
the district court's decision and the oral argument in the Third Circuit).
166. Pic-A-State Pa., 76 F.3d at 1297.
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'performing brain surgery with stone tools."1 67 Recent cases, however,
have significantly clarified the analysis.
One initial concern regarding personal jurisdiction and the Internet was
whether the operator of an Internet site could, without suspecting it, be
subject to prosecution in any jurisdiction from which the site could be
accessed, raising the specter of potential jurisdiction worldwide. That is not
the way the law has evolved, however, and properly so. Instead, employing
the traditional two-pronged analysis, courts ask, first, whether there are
sufficient contacts to ensure that in-state effects are sufficiently foreseeable
for the site operator to have to defend a lawsuit there and, second, whether
an assertion of jurisdiction is fair under due process. 61
Moreover, in recent cases, courts have focused not just on whether an
Internet transmission has occurred, but on the types of transmissions
involved. In so doing, they have developed a continuum, whereby personal
jurisdiction can be asserted over a Web site operation depending on the
degree of interactivity the site allows or encourages with users in the forum
state. 69 At one end of the continuum, courts generally do not find personal
jurisdiction over purely passive Web sites that simply provide information
to users. 7° In the middle are advertising sites that may list a toll-free number
or otherwise more actively solicit business. These sites present close calls,
and the decisions involving them are extremely fact-specific and go either
167. Gorman & Loo, supra note 18, at 708 (quoting I. Nelson Rose, Wire Cops: The A.G.'s
Take on Internet Gambling, CAsINO ExEcUTiVE, Aug. 22, 1995, at 22).
168. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985); World-Wide
Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980). For examples of Internet-related cases taking
this two-pronged approach, see infra notes 170-171.
169. See Zippo Mfg. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1123-24 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
170. For instance, the Web site at issue in Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp.
295, 297 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), affd, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997), simply contained "general
information about the [night]club in Missouri as well as a calendar of events and ticketing
information." See also Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 419 (9th Cir. 1997)
(dismissing for lack of personal jurisdiction an action brought in Arizona against a company that
had no contacts with the forum state other than maintaining "an essentially passive home page on
the [Web," which was accessible by anyone and from anywhere, and holding there must be
"'something more' to indicate that the defendant purposefully (albeit electronically) directed his
activity in a substantial way to the forum state"); Scherr v. Abrahams, No. 97 C 5453, 1998 WL
299678, at *4 (N.D. I. May 29, 1998) (holding that where advertising on the defendant's Web
site was not specifically targeted at Illinois consumers, contacts were not sufficient to create
jurisdiction over the defendant); Blackburn v. Walker Oriental Rug Galleries, 999 F. Supp. 636,
639 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (holding that a "passive" Web site featuring the defendant's national
advertising is not sufficient contact with a forum for an exercise of personal jurisdiction); SF Hotel
Co. v. Energy Invs., 985 F. Supp. 1032, 1035 (D. Kan. 1997) (holding that, in a trademark
infringement case involving the mark "Sierra Suites," a passive Web site that "provides general
information about its hotel" did not support personal jurisdiction over the Florida defendant);
Transcraft Corp. v. Doonan Trailer Corp., No. 97 C 4943, 1997 WL 733905, at *8-*10 (N.D. Ill.
Nov. 12, 1997) (refusing to exercise personal jurisdiction over a Kansas defendant based on the
existence of a passive Web site and several other commercial activities allegedly connected with
Illinois); Agar Corp. v. Multi-Fluid Inc., No. 95-5105, 1997 WL 829340 (S.D. Tex. June 25, 1997)
(refusing to exercise personal jurisdiction over a Norwegian defendant based on its passive Web
site and several other tenuous links to Texas).
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way, sometimes depending on whether the Web sites constitute "passively
informational, rather than solicitous advertisements." 7 1 At the far end of the
spectrum are sites that interact with users and conduct business online.'72
Courts have had little difficulty finding jurisdiction in these situations.
The best argument as to why Internet gambling operators should not be
subject to personal jurisdiction in every venue from which their sites are
accessed is a variation on an argument made by Professor Dan L. Burk:
Because the Internet does not permit Web site operators to discriminate by
jurisdiction, "its contacts with any given jurisdiction are less, rather than
more purposeful." 173 Gambling site operators simply will contend that they
cannot possibly know where individuals visiting their sites reside.
Whatever the merits of Burk's concerns in the abstract, they seem
misplaced given the realities of Internet gambling. In virtually all cases in
which actual bets have been accepted, ample facts will support the argument
that the operators knew exactly where their customers lived and had
sufficiently significant contacts to satisfy a purposeful availment analysis.174
For example, in Thompson v. Handa-Lopez, Inc.,175 a lawsuit commenced
by a Texas resident to recover $193,728.40 in winnings from a California
gambling Web site, the court found that the exercise of jurisdiction was
proper in light of what it characterized as "more extensive interaction" than
171. Shapiro v. Santa Fe Gaming Corp., No. 97 C 6117, 1998 WL 102677, at *2 (N.D. Ill.
Feb. 27, 1998) (characterizing the law as well-settled that the maintenance of a toll-free telephone
number and a passive, non-advertising Web site, "without more, is insufficient to satisfy
jurisdiction"); see also Bunn-O-Matic Corp. v. Bunn Coffee Serv., No. 97-3259, 1998 WL 207860
(C.D. Ill. Apr. 1, 1998) (holding that a "passive" Web site constitutes "entry" into a forum);
Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, 994 F. Supp. 34, 41-42, 43-44 (D. Mass. 1997) (expressing
concern over cases holding that the existence of a Web site alone is sufficient to allow jurisdiction
but noting that, in the case before it, the injury occurred in Massachusetts and defendants solicited
business there by, inter alia, soliciting e-mail contacts); Superguide Corp. v. Kegan, 987 F. Supp.
481, 487 (W.D.N.C. 1997) (exercising personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant based
solely on the accessibility in North Carolina of the defendant's Web site); Smith v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, 968 F. Supp. 1356, 1364 (W.D. Ark. 1997) (requiring that, to be subject to jurisdiction,
Web site advertising be actively solicitous, thus preventing the chaotic conclusion "that a
company is subject to personal jurisdiction at each and every location on the planet where
someone is capable of logging on the Interet"); Inset Sys. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp.
161, 165 (D. Conn. 1996) (finding a Web site that listed a toll-free number subject to jurisdiction
because advertising via the Internet was solicitation of a sufficient repetitive nature).
172. See CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1268 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding
jurisdiction where a Web site user actively communicated with an online service and used it to sell
his software over the Internet); Mieczkowski v. Masco Corp., 997 F. Supp. 782, 787 (E.D. Tex.
1998) (finding adequate jurisdiction exercised where remote customers would view purchases
online, check their status, and communicate with a sales representative).
173. Burk, supra note 10, 54.
174. For a general discussion of purposeful availment, see Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,
253 (1958). See also Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474-76 (1985) (holding that the
deliberate creation of contacts with a particular jurisdiction satisfies the personal jurisdiction test).
The Southern District of New York complaints reveal that many gambling site operators
specifically request information about their customers' locations. See Sealed Complaint 11,
United States v. Moore, No. 98-m-00677) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 1998) (" www.galaxysports.com").
175. 998 F. Supp. 738 (W.D. Tex. 1998).
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in those cases at the beginning and middle of the continuum.'76 It
specifically noted that the defendant "continuously interacted with the
casino players, entering into contracts with them... knowing it would
receive commercial gain" from them, that Texas residents played those
games "as if they were physically located in Texas," and that any winnings
were ultimately to be delivered to Texas.177
Moreover, it is difficult to argue that Internet casino and sports-betting
sites that advertise both online and in national magazines, collect wagers
from and transmit winnings to the United States, and post odds and scores
on professional sporting events in the United States do not subject
themselves to jurisdiction in every state where their patrons cut the virtual
cards. There is a huge difference between the abstract, technological
possibility that a site will be accessed from a given location-a prospect
that, in and of itself, ordinarily should not trigger jurisdiction-and the
undisputed fact that before any gambling occurs, an Internet gambling site
will have taken many steps to make sure it gets money from the gamblers. 78
D. U.S. Criminal Law Reaches Offshore
Commentators'79 and cybercasino operators"8 ' have expressed concerns
that American efforts to curb Internet gambling may interfere with the laws
of other countries. They argue that most Internet gambling sites are properly
licensed in countries such as Costa Rica and Antigua, where they support
176. Id. at 744.
177. Id. According to the court, the plaintiff "entered into a contract to play the game on
Defendant's Web site," id. at 741, under which "the Defendant would send the winnings to the
Plaintiff in Texas," id. at 744. But cf. Humphrey v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., 568 N.W.2d 715,
719 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that long-arm jurisdiction was properly exercised over
defendants located in Nevada, who operated an Internet casino with a server in Belize, based on
transmissions of information advertising the casino, even though no betting transactions occurred).
178. See infra notes 196-209 and accompanying text (detailing the contacts of Interet
gambling sites with their customers' jurisdictions in the Southern District of New York
complaints). In addition to jurisdictional due process concerns, there also is the due process issue
of whether, prior to the first Internet gambling prosecutions, Internet gambling operators had fair
notice that their operations were condemned by § 1084. Given the breadth of § 1084, its prior
application to the offshore, telephone-based equivalents of Internet gambling, the legislative
history indicating its applicability to all forms of gambling operations relying on "wire
communications facilities," and the number of articles noting the possibility of prosecutions under
§ 1084, it is difficult to argue they did not. Absent a showing that the statute is void for
vagueness-and § 1084 has survived challenges on that basis, see United States v. Borgese, 235 F.
Supp. 286, 295-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); United States v. Smith, 209 F. Supp. 907, 918 (E.D. l.
1962)-misjudging the scope of § 1084 does not create a due process issue. Nor does such
misjudging establish a lack of requisite intent. See United States v. Spy Factory, Inc., 960 F. Supp.
684, 687-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (distinguishing between statutes that set forth knowledge of a
specific legal duty as an element of a crime and those that do not and applying the well-established
maxim that, in the latter case, "ignorance of the law is no excuse").
179. See sources cited supra note 18.
180. See Kyl Bill Hearing, supra note 5, at 41-43 (statement of Jay Cohen, President & CEO,
World Sports Exch.).
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the local economy by paying up to $100,000 in license fees alone to do
business.'81 Any interference, they maintain, would violate the sovereignty
of those host countries and smack of colonialism.182
Such concerns ignore both legal and practical realities. The offshore
reach of U.S. criminal law is well established.'83 Some laws, for instance,
apply by their specific terms to acts "committed outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States." ' Others, including the Wire Wager
Act,185 the Travel Act,'86 and the ITWPA,'87 criminalize acts involving
"interstate or foreign commerce" that permit or aid gambling, 8 which
strongly implies extraterritorial application.'89 American laws also have
been applied to foreign criminal activities that affect the United States. This
concept is not new; in Horwitz v. United States, the defendants were
prosecuted for conducting a lottery over the radio from a station located in
Mexico that solicited participation by, inter alia, residents of Texas!'9 In
colorful language, the concurring opinion stated: "If [a] pistol... takes
intended criminal effect from Mexico in the United States, the United States
may punish .... [M]ailed lottery receipts and checks are like bullets that hit
their mark." 9' Such "effects" tests also have allowed courts to find
extraterritorial jurisdiction over a Panamanian dictator accused of violating
U.S. drug laws9 2 and over defendants who entered into fraudulent marriages
181. See 2 CABOT, supra note 4, at 73.
182. "There's a terrible stigma attached to everything that is done in this quarter of the world
[and that] give[s] rise to a feeling that we couldn't possibly ... run a virtual gaming operation on a
level that would be acceptable to the standards of the United States.... [Olperators in Antigua and
Barbuda are subject to the laws of Antigua and Barbuda and they are not subject to any laws which
are not identifiable under a specific treaty with the United States." ABC Nightline (ABC television
broadcast, Apr. 7, 1998) (interview with Jeannette McAlister, Antiguan international investment
worker).
183. See Robbins, supra note 18, at 41; Gorman & Loo, supra note 18, at 686.
184. 21 U.S.C. § 959 (1994) (proscribing "[p]ossession, manufacture, or distribution of
controlled substance or listed chemical"). "Section 959, prohibiting the distribution of narcotics
intending that they be imported into the United States, is clearly meant to apply extraterritorially.
The statute expressly states that it is 'intended to reach acts of manufacture or distribution
committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States."' United States v. Noriega, 746
F. Supp. 1506, 1515 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 859(c)), aff'd, 117 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1389 (1998).
185. 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1994).
186. Il § 1952.
187. Id. § 1953.
188. ld § 1953(a).
189. See Noriega, 746 F. Supp. at 1518-19 (noting that the broad statutory language of the
Travel Act is intended "to reach criminal activities ... beyond state and national borders" and
applies if "the defendant causes interstate travel or activity to promote an unlawful
purpose ... whether or not the defendant is physically present in the United States").
190. 63 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1933).
191. Id. at 709 (Sibley, J., concurring).
192. See Noriega, 746 F. Supp. at 1515 (" [B]ecause Noriega's conduct in Panama is alleged
to have resulted in a direct effect within the United States, the Court concludes that extraterritorial
jurisdiction is appropriate as a matter of international law.").
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abroad in order to enter the United States illegally.' 93 Additionally, U.S.
criminal laws have been found to reach acts occurring abroad, if "part of the
offense[] occurred within the United States," 194 as in the case of an Italian
citizen who sent child pornography from Italy to an American address,
partially via U.S. mail. 95 In short, it has long been accepted that the United
States may, in appropriate cases, use its domestic law to prosecute
internationally-based criminal acts.
Furthermore, as a practical matter, many, if not most, of the
cybercasinos are not the product of a native cottage industry. Instead, they
typically involve U.S. residents alighting on foreign soil and targeting their
fellow citizens from abroad. Their U.S. contacts are not limited to
cyberspace. As the complaints filed in the Southern District of New York
show, gambling sites require numerous non-cyber contacts with U.S.
citizens, all of which involve the instrumentalities of interstate commerce
and therefore violate federal law. For instance, the investigations of SDB
Global and World Sports Exchange revealed the following U.S. contacts:
* The companies advertised nationally in College & Pro Football
Newsweekly and Pro Football Weekly.' 96
* A letter and brochure describing SDB Global and telling how to
open an account bore the return address "SDB Global, S.A., 82
Wall Street, New York, New York 10005," 197 where SDB Global
had offices and did its marketing. 98 Other literature was mailed
from Miami. 9 9 Information about World Sports Exchange was
mailed to New York from California.00
* To open an account, SDB required a money transfer via Bankers
Trust in New York.2"' World Sports Exchange required its users to
193. See Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d 545, 548 (9th Cir. 1961) (finding that jurisdiction
"rested not only on the act abroad, but also on the effect it produced within the boundaries of the
United States").
194. United States v. Moncini, 882 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1989).
195. See id. (holding that the crime continued as the letter traveled through the mail and
reached its U.S. destinations and was not "complete at the time the letter was deposited in the mail
in Italy").
196. See Sealed Complaint 29, United States v. Budin, No. 98-m-00463 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2,
1998) ("www.sdbg.com"); Sealed Complaint 24-25, United States v. J. Cohen, (No. 98-m-
00465 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 1998) (" www.wsex.com" ).
197. See Sealed Complaint 9, United States v. Budin, No. 98-m-00463 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2,
1998) ("www.sbdg.com").
198. See id. H 22-23.
199. Seeid. 1l.
200. See Sealed Complaint 20e n.4, United States v. J. Cohen, No. 98-m-00465 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 2, 1998) ("www.wsex.com").
201. See Sealed Complaint I 11, United States v. Budin, No. 98-m-00463 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2,
1998) (" www.sbdg.com").
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transfer money via Western Union,2' and maintained an account at
Chase Manhattan Bank in New York, through which wire transfers
were made to Antigua."
* Money from a customer's SDB account was sent to New York from
an address in North Miami Beach, Florida, and was payable through
a bank in Miami.2' Checks payable through the Chase Manhattan
Bank in New York City were received in New York from World
Sports Exchange via Federal Express."'
* The toll-free number over which SDB accepted bets was registered
to a person in Aventura, Florida2 6 and showed calls from all over
the United States. 7 The World Sports Exchange toll-free number
was provided by an exchange in Mississippi and registered to a
person in Georgia."'
* Dun & Bradstreet listed SDB Global as based in Miami.209
These non-Internet contacts with the United States do not appear to be
either incidental or avoidable. Although in the future it may be possible to
do business with U.S. customers from Antigua without using U.S. banks,
U.S. mails, U.S. publications, U.S. telephones, and U.S. addresses, that day
is not here. As long as Internet gambling sites have to attract American
customers, who account for over fifty percent of Internet use,210 these
contacts are inevitable, and they inevitably provide both a substantive basis
for federal prosecution and an ample foundation for the assertion of
jurisdiction over criminal defendants.
202. See Sealed Complaint 10, United States v. J. Cohen, No. 98-m-00465 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
2, 1998) ("www.wsex.com" ).
203. See id. 23.
204. See Sealed Complaint 18, United States v. Budin, No. 98-m-00463 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2,
1998) ("www.sbdg.com").
205. See Sealed Complaint 16, 18, United States v. J. Cohen, No. 98-m-00465 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 2, 1998) ("www.wsex.com").
206. See Sealed Complaint 18, United States v. Budin, No. 98-m-00463 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2,
1998) ("www.sbdg.com").
207. See id. 28.
208. See Sealed Complaint 21-22, United States v. J. Cohen, No. 98-m-00465 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 2, 1998) (" www.wsex.com").
209. See Sealed Complaint 26, United States v. Budin, No. 98-m-00463 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2,
1998) ("www.sbdg.com").
210. See Computer Industry Almanac Inc., Top 15 Countries with the Most Internet Users,
(last modified Jan. 1998) <http://www.c-i-a.com/199801pr.htm>.
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E. Antigambling Statutes Can Be Applied to Cyberspace as Readily as
Other Laws
Arguments that the Internet requires a different legal regime rely on the
assumption that its unique characteristics will make it difficult, if not
impossible, for courts to apply existing laws sensibly in the digital era.
211
That assumption is seriously overstated. Rather than accepting it
uncritically, the inquiry should be whether there is anything unique about
the use of the Internet for gambling that should inhibit its prosecution under
current law in jurisdictions where other, non-digital gambling is illegal.
The more the mechanics of Internet gambling are reviewed,21 2 the more
it appears to be a new-media imitation of what federal law has long
condemned when practiced via other communications media, such as the
telephone and fax.213 This renders gambling quite amenable to the
traditional kind of media-neutral approach used in intellectual property law.
Media-neutral application of law is familiar in copyright, for instance,
largely because of the extraordinary effort made to ensure that the
Copyright Act of 1976 would work well in the digital age. For that reason,
the "subject matter of copyright" is defined as "original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later
developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device."214
The media-neutrality of copyright law is further reflected in its legislative
history: "Authors are continually finding new ways of expressing
themselves, but it is impossible to foresee the forms that these new
expressive methods will take.' 215 The following characterization of the
nation's copyright laws therefore remains apt in the information age:
[Y]ou can read the bill from beginning to end and you won't find in
it any reference to computers, for example. Yet these are one of the
coming instruments of communication in the future. We have tried
to phrase the broad rights granted in such a way that they can be
adapted as time goes on to each of the new advancing media.2"6
211. See Burk, supra note 10, 6; Johnson & Post, supra note 10, at 1367.
212. See supra notes 165-178 and accompanying text.
213. See Hardy, supra note 17, at 1000.
214. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994). The Act further defines a "device" or "machine" as "one
now known or later developed." Id. § 101.
215. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 51 (1976).
216. Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on H.R. 4347, 5680, 6831, 6835 Before Subcomn.
No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 57 (1965) (statement of George D. Cary,
Deputy Register of Copyright). Further, although the concept of fixation was, from the outset, the
sine qua non for protection under the new Act, "it makes no difference what the form, manner, or
medium of fixation may be-whether it is in words, numbers, notes, sounds, pictures, or any other
graphic or symbolic indicia, whether embodied in a physical object in written, printed,
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A recent decision illustrates the importance of the media-neutrality of
the Copyright Act. In 1993, a coalition of freelance writers sued the New
York Times and other major publications for including their contributions in
the electronic editions of periodicals made available on the Lexis-Nexis
electronic research database and in CD-ROM format. In Tasini v. New York
Times,"1 7 the court ruled in favor of the publications, finding that the
electronic versions of the periodicals in dispute fell within the "any
revision" language of section 201(c) of the Copyright Act, which grants
publishers the "right to revise their collective works," including
transforming them into digital versions.218 The court noted the lengths to
which Congress went to study the impact of computers on copyright219 to
ensure that it had drafted a media-neutral statute. It concluded that "it is to
be presumed that the terms of the 1976 Act encompass all variety of
developing technologies." 
20
Even without such specific guidance from Congress, courts have
applied the Copyright Act in a media-neutral way. For example, in
Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication
Services,22' Netcom, an Internet service provider, was accused of infringing
copyrights in Scientology tracts by providing Internet access to a computer
bulletin board service on which portions of those works were stored.2' The
court rejected the argument that such storage made Netcom directly liable
for copyright infringement. Instead, it analogized Netcom to "the owner of
a copying machine who lets the public make copies with it" 223 and held that
direct infringement requires "some element of volition or causation which
is lacking where a defendant's system is merely used to create a copy by a
third party."'224 By refusing to construe the Act so literally, the court
refrained from penalizing Internet users and operators who had done no
photographic, sculptural, punched, magnetic, or any other stable form." H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at
52 (1976).
217. 972 F. Supp. 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). The author, along with others at Debevoise &
Plimpton, represented the defendants in this case.
218. See id. at 826-27.
219. See, e.g., NATIONAL COMM'N ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED
WORKS, FINAL REPORT (1978).
220. Tasini, 972 F. Supp. at 818; cf. Ryan v. Carl Corp., 23 F. Supp.2d 1146, 1149-50
(N.D. Cal. 1998) (concluding that 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (1994) does not permit the republication of
individual contributions apart from other contributions in the original or revised collective work,
but questioning the equities and societal inefficiencies of such a result).
221. 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1365 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
222. See id. at 1367-68.
223. Id. at 1369.
224. Id. at 1370. The wisdom of the Netcom decision did not escape Congress, which recently
amended the Copyright Act to compel the same conclusion. See Digital Millennium Copyright
Act, § 202(a), 112 Stat. 2860, 2877-86 (1998) (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512).
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more than "implement a system that is essential if Usenet messages are to
be widely distributed." 2
The media-neutral application of old laws to Internet activities is no
more difficult in the criminal context. In People v. Lipsitz,22 6 the court held
that a magazine subscription scheme that aggressively marketed to members
of "listservs" 227 but did not deliver the subscriptions as promised could be
prosecuted for fraud. Responding to its own inquiry as to whether there
were Internet-related reasons why such a scheme should not be prosecuted
in New York, the court placed the question in a "realistic
context... leav[ing] behind the rarified air of cyberspace" and concluded:
There is no compelling reason to find that local legal officials must
take a "hands off" approach just because a crook or a con artist is
technologically sophisticated enough to sell on the Internet.
Invocation of "the Internet" is not the equivalent to a cry of
"sanctuary" upon a criminal's entry into a medieval church. It
should be sufficient that the laws sought to be applied.., are
"media neutral" and otherwise pass constitutional muster.22
The Justice Department struck a similar note in explaining its decision
to prosecute Internet gambling under the Wire Wager Act, maintaining that
§ 1084 applies equally to the Internet as to any "wire communication
facility" that was in existence when the Act was passed. In fact, U.S.
Attorney General Janet Reno, in announcing the arrests and complaints,
used language strikingly similar to the Lipsitz opinion:
The Internet is not an electronic sanctuary for illegal betting. If a
state outlaws soliciting or accepting bets, you can't evade those
requirements by going on-line. It's a federal crime to use the
Internet to conduct betting operations. And to Internet betting
operators everywhere we have a simple message; You can't hide
on-line and you can't hide off-shore.229
Some commentators disagree with Attorney General Reno's assertion,
however, suggesting that the ability of Internet gambling operators to hide,
both on-line and off-shore, makes enforcement impossible and, therefore,
225. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1370. The Usenet is "a worldwide community of electronic
[bulletin board services] that is closely associated with the Internet and with the Internet
community." Id. at 1365 nA.
226. 663 N.Y.S.2d 468 (Sup. Ct. 1997).
227. A "listserv" is an e-mail discussion group. lId at 471.
228. Id. at475.
229. United States Attorney, supra note 106. The SEC also has vigorously pursued
individuals and companies who use the Internet to promote stocks in ways that violate the
securities laws. Since 1995, when it began to police the Internet, it has brought a total of 61 on-line
fraud and related cases. See SEC Charges 44 Internet Stock Promoters with Fraud, Dow JoNES
INTERAcTIVE BUS. & FIN. REP., Oct. 28, 1998, at *2 [hereinafter SEC Charges].
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makes any legislation in this area an empty gesture.30 By disguising their
on-line identities, they argue, gambling operators may escape detection and
identification altogether; by moving themselves and their assets from
account to account and country to country, they may make such assets
untraceable and unattachable; by remaining permanently offshore, they
may, short of kidnapping or extradition, escape U.S. law entirely.
There are two problems with these arguments. First, thus far, it is
impossible even to register a domain name or establish a Web site
anonymously, if only because registration services require reliable billing
information. 3" Web site operators necessarily leave footprints, ultimately
making them vulnerable to the same investigative techniques that law
enforcement has traditionally used-including sting operations and sham
accounts opened by undercover operatives.3 2
Second, investigative techniques do not appear to have lagged behind in
cyberspace. As early as 1995, FBI and state authorities cooperated in a sting
operation on the Internet, whereby agents posing as minors developed
enough incriminating evidence to arrest a dozen online child
pornographers. 3 Additionally, the SEC, FTC, and state attorneys general
offices have long been active in monitoring and investigating Internet fraud
schemes. 4 There is every reason to expect that, just as Internet gambling
230. See, e.g., Robbins, supra note 18, at 51 ("Unlike traditional illegal gambling operations,
which require a secure and readily accessible location for customers, Internet casino operations
can move from country to country while maintaining the same Web site."); Richard Raysman &
Peter Brown, Cyber-Casinos: Gambling Meets the Internet, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 12, 1997, at 3
(" [U]nike traditional casinos, operators of cyber-casinos have the ability to move from country to
country, since operation of a cyber-casino merely requires maintenance of a Web site."); Kelly
Flaherty, Feds' Internet Bet Case Avoids 'Cyber' Issues, L.J. EXTRA! 13 (Mar. 6, 1998)
<http://w-w.ljextra.com/intemet/0306betjuris.html> (" [If gambling site operators] choose to
remain outside the U.S. and don't have any financial assets within American borders, they may be
effectively out of reach of the justice system. Or they could view the fines as a cost of doing
business.").
231. See, for example, Network Solutions, Inc.'s Domain Name Registration Policies, which
require the name, address, phone, fax and e-mail address of an "administrative contact" for each
registrant, see Network Solutions, Inc., Domain Name Registration Agreement § Q (last modified
Mar. 1998) <ftp://rs.interiic.netltemplates/domain-template.txt>, who can "answer non-technical
questions about the legal entity's plans for using the domain name and the procedures for
establishing sub-domains," Domain Name Registration Agreement (Version 4.0) Instructions (last
modified Mar. 30, 1998) <http:llrs.intermic.netlhelp/instructions.txt>. Similar information is
required for "technical" and "billing" contacts. See Network Solutions, Inc., supra, § Q.
232. See, e.g., Sealed Complaint 18, United States v. B. Cohen, No. 98-m-00462 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 2, 1998) (" www.wsex.com").
233. See David Johnston, Use of Computer Network for Child Sex Sets off Raids, N.Y. TIws,
Sept. 14, 1995, at Al.
234. See, e.g., Dominic Bencivenga, Internet Cyberforce: SEC and FTC Crack Down on On-
line Fraud, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 3, 1998, at 5 ("SEC employs a cyberforce that includes more than 100
staff attorneys, analysts and accountants who over the past few years have received special training
in Internet surveillance.... More than 300 [FTC] staff members, including attorneys and
investigators, have been trained in Internet surveillance .... ); see also Christopher Wolf & Scott
Shorr, Cybercops Are Cracking Down on Internet Fraud, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 13, 1997, at B12
(detailing SEC, FTC, and state Internet prosecutions).
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operators grow more sophisticated, so too will law enforcement's ability to
reach them, uncover their true identities and assess their contacts with U.S.-
based gamblers. As one FTC investigator recently put it:
Some people make a little too much of the fancy nature of the
Net .... [Internet operators] have real names, real addresses and
telephone numbers and they want their money .... Always follow
the money. That basic premise still holds.23 5
VI. CONCLUSION
This Essay has set forth two reasons why it is wrong to contend that
Internet gambling facilitated by Web sites based offshore cannot be
prosecuted under existing federal law. 6 First, such arguments fail to
appreciate the long history of successful federal prosecution of gambling
operations conducted by earlier long distance communication methods 7
Second, and more significantly, they fail to recognize that Internet gambling
sites use the Internet only as an instrument to commit a very traditional
crime. In other words, nothing about the Internet makes illegal gambling
any different from gambling carried on and successfully prosecuted via the
mail, a telegraph, a telephone, or a fax machine.z 8 Therefore, this Essay has
characterized Internet gambling as a media-neutral offenseY9
Other laws, both civil and criminal, are similarly media-neutral and can
be applied to Internet activity without the need for new models or legal
regimes.24 In the criminal context, as long as the Internet is not the object or
235. Bencivenga, supra note 234, at 5 (quoting Jodie Bernstein, Director, FrC Bureau of
Consumer Protection) (alteration in original).
236. See supra notes 8-18 and accompanying text
237. See generally supra Part Ill.
238. See Sheri A. Dillon et al., Computer Crimes, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 503, 504 (1998)
(distinguishing between traditional crimes committed with a computer and "technologically
specific offenses that are arguably not analogous to any non-computer crimes").
239. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 216-239 and accompanying text. According to the FTC, "commerce on
the Internet falls under the broad sweep of [its] statutory mandate," which is "to protect
consumers from unfair or deceptive acts or practices." Electronic Commerce-Part 3: Hearings
Before the Telecomm., Trade, and Consumer Protection Subcomm. of the House Comm. on
Commerce, 105th Cong. 245 (1998) (statement of Eileen Harrington, Assoc. Dir., Bureau of
Consumer Protection, FTC). Although "[m]ost of the Commission's law enforcement
actions.., have involved old-fashioned scams dressed up in high-tech garb," id. at 247, the FrC's
traditional "unfair deceptive acts and practices" standard has proved media-neutral enough to
derail "one scheme that uniquely and ingeniously exploited what can be done on the Internet and
only on the Internet," id. at 249 (describing FTC v. Audiotex Connection, Inc., No. CV-97 0726
(DRH) (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 1997), in which the FTC obtained a stipulated permanent injunction
against "a scheme that 'hijacked' consumers' computer modems by surreptitiously disconnecting
them from their local Internet Service Provider... and reconnecting them to the Internet through a
high-priced international modem connection, purportedly going to Moldova but actually
terminating in Canada").
1999] 1607
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 108:1569
subject of the crime24 but is instead the instrument by which an otherwise
criminal act is committed, it is difficult to comprehend why any new legal
regime is necessary.
United States v. Thomas42 demonstrates how traditional law can be
applied in a media-neutral way to crimes facilitated via the Internet. In
Thomas, two defendants, both California residents, were convicted in
Tennessee for transmitting to Tennessee obscene material via their bulletin
board service. A postal inspector in Memphis, Tennessee, joined that
service under an assumed name; he subsequently received images over
interstate telephone lines and by mail that depicted a wide variety of sexual
conduct, including bestiality and excretory fetishism. A jury determined that
the materials were obscene under Memphis's "contemporary community
standards."243
The Thomases' convictions were upheld by the Sixth Circuit. The panel
rejected the argument that the Thomases should have been judged by the
community standards of California rather than Tennessee, citing evidence
that the Thomases, knowing the undercover postal inspector was located in
Memphis, nonetheless made a conscious decision to permit him to subscribe
to their service.
The application of Tennessee's community standards to an obscenity
prosecution of California residents has been criticized on several grounds.2'
Whatever the ultimate wisdom of the result in Thomas, which the Sixth
Circuit took care to depict as fact specific,245 the case further illustrates the
241. See Dillon et al., supra note 238, at 507 (arguing that the computer is the "object" of a
crime when the offender targets the computer itself, as in theft of computer processor time or
computerized services, the "subject" of a crime when it is the site of, source of, or reason for,
"unique forms of asset loss," as in the distribution of viruses, or an "instrument" used to commit
traditional crimes).
242. 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996).
243. Id. at 706, 710. The Thomases were also convicted of sending obscene videotapes across
state lines. See id. at 706.
244. See, e.g., Debra D. Burke, Cybersmut and the First Amendment: A Call for a New
Obscenity Standard, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 87, 126 (1996) (arguing that imputing to every
network user the knowledge of hundreds of contemporary community standards "is simply
unrealistic"); Pamela A. Huelster, Cybersex and Community Standards, 75 B.U. L. REV. 865
(1996) (suggesting, inter alia, that local standards should give way to a single, national obscenity
standard for computer bulletin board services); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Virtual Reality and
"Virtual Welters": A Note on the Commerce Clause Implications of Regulating Cyberporn, 82
VA. L. REV. 535, 536 (1996) (suggesting that, in addition to First Amendment concerns, the
Commerce Clause presents "serious difficulties" for locality-based regulation of computer
bulletin board systems).
245. The Sixth Circuit was able to distinguish, on the facts before it, the Thomases' conduct
from "a situation where the bulletin board operator had no knowledge or control over the
jurisdiction where materials were distributed for downloading .... Defendants had in place
methods to limit user access in jurisdictions where the risk of finding of obscenity was
greater .... They knew they had a member in Memphis." Thomas, 74 F.3d at 711. The Thomas
court also pointed out that the Supreme Court, in Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115,
125-26 (1989), "found no constitutional impediment" in requiring distributors of adult content to
tailor their materials to the standards of a particular community. Thomas, 74 F.3d at 712.
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media-neutrality of laws of general application. The knowing transmission
of sexual content from California to Tennessee via the Internet is no
different from sending it by mail. The same is true of Internet gambling:
Although setting up a casino or bookmaking operation in cyberspace
requires more sophistication than running a sports-betting operation by
telephone or mail, the underlying crimes are identical, whatever the
medium.
There are, undoubtedly, Internet-specific crimes that can be attacked
only in a media-specific manner. When a computer system is itself the
subject or object of a crime, the offense is subject to media-specific laws.246
For example, a crime such as hacking into a credit card computer system
and using the information to obtain fraudulent credit cards is punishable, not
by media neutral laws, but by specific federal statutes that cover computer
crimes.247 The same laws thwarted a scheme by a hacker named Eugene
Kashpureff to divert Internet traffic that was intended for InterNIC-
registered Web sites (domain names ending in ".com," ".net," ".org," etc.)
to his own "AlterNIC" domains (".sex" and ".web").2'
Concerning Internet gambling, however, as Professor Hardy notes in a
different context, "[t]here is nothing about the connection medium itself that
matters here or that differs from other communication means."'249 Indeed,
given the broad language of § 1084, which prohibits the use of any wired or
similarly connected communications service from being used for gambling,
one can argue that the Wire Wager Act was drafted to ensure that the
precise nature of the wiring used is irrelevant. This Essay concludes,
therefore, that there is no reason why courts should not apply § 1084 to
enforce federal gambling policy on the Internet.
246. See Dillon et al., supra note 238, at 506.
247. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1994 & Supp. 1111998) (prescribing penalties for engaging
in "[flraud and related activity in connection with computers"); id. § 2511 (1994 & Supp. III
1998) (prohibiting the "interception and disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic communications");
see also United States v. Peterson, 98 F.3d 502, 504 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming the sentence of a
computer hacker who pled guilty to, inter alia, violating the aforementioned statutes).
248. Dillon et al., supra note 238, at 504 n.4.
249. Hardy, supra note 17, at 1000 (commenting that libel or copyright infringement is the
same offense whether committed via e-mail, fax, or U.S. mail).
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